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Gutting Bivens: How the Supreme Court 
Shielded Federal Officials from 
Constitutional Litigation 
Alexander J. Lindvall* 
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. . . . All officers 
of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and 
are bound to obey it. . . . [And the] Courts of justice are established, not only to 
decide upon the controverted rights of the citizens as against each other, but also 
upon rights in controversy between them and the government.” 
—United States v. Lee (1882)1  
  
 
*Assistant City Attorney, Civil Division, Mesa, Arizona.  J.D., Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.  B.A., magna cum laude, 
Iowa State University.  Alex Lindvall is a civil defense attorney, whose practice 
focuses on municipal defense, § 1983 claims, and constitutional litigation.  
 1. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bivens has been gutted.2  In two recent cases, the United States Supreme 
Court adopted the narrowest possible reading of Bivens,3 and two Justices 
outright called for its overruling.4  In real-world terms, these decisions mean 
that many federal officials will not be held accountable—at least not through 
the courts—for their disturbing and unconstitutional behavior.  In the Court’s 
most recent Bivens case, Hernández v. Mesa, the Court held that a United 
States Border Patrol agent could not be sued for shooting an unarmed fifteen-
year-old in the back.5  In another recent case, Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held 
that several high-ranking federal officials could not be sued for implementing 
and administering a policy that systematically rounded-up, jailed, and tortured 
Muslim immigrants.6  
The results of these cases are unacceptable.  In the United States, there 
should be consequences for shooting an unarmed child in the back, and there 
should be consequences for systematically jailing and torturing ethnic 
minorities without cause.  To be clear, the results of these cases were 
avoidable—but the Court’s conservative majority chose these results.  The 
Abbasi and Hernández majorities simply rejected the precedents that would 
have allowed the plaintiffs to have their day in court and instead chose to limit 
Bivens suits based on their own personal predilections.  The Court’s 
dismissive attitude towards these very serious claims is troubling to say the 
least.  
But what is even more troubling is that these decisions are 
“unsurprising”7 given the Court’s “disturbing campaign” of “using legal 
technicalities to keep people from getting a fair hearing.”8  As Erwin 
Chemerinsky has recognized, the Court has been methodically “closing the 
courthouse door” on plaintiffs for nearly a half-century.9  The Court’s 
conservative Justices have, on their own accord, placed a series of 
complicated procedural hurdles in front of plaintiffs, allowing the courts to 
 
 2. See infra Section II.A (discussing a brief history of Bivens and its 
progeny).  
 3. See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 
S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017).  
 4. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 752–53 (Thomas and Gorsuch, J.J., concurring).   
 5. Id. at 744, 746 (majority opinion).  
 6. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860, 1862–63.   
 7. Shirin Sinnar, The Ziglar v. Abbasi Decision: Unsurprising and 
Devastating, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL: SLS BLOGS, (June 20, 2017), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/06/20/the-ziglar-v-abbasi-decision-unsurprising-
and-devastating/ [https://perma.cc/H34D-37QP].   
 8. Editorial Board, Throwing Out Mr. Iqbal’s Case, N.Y. TIMES, (May 19, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/opinion/20weds3.html 
[https://perma.cc/58DT-PHWM]. 
 9. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: 
HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE i–xi (2017).  
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dodge difficult yet important constitutional questions.10  The Court’s 
justiciability doctrines, governmental immunity requirements, and Bivens 
limitations have made the federal courts inaccessible to many plaintiffs and 
have made many constitutional rights unenforceable.11 
This Article makes three primary arguments.  First, this Article argues 
the results of Abbasi and Hernández are completely unacceptable in “a 
government of laws, and not of men.”12  These decisions undermine some of 
our nation’s most important values and allow federal officials to remain above 
the law.  Second, this Article argues that the Court’s conservative majority 
chose the results of these cases.  For the last thirty years or so, conservative 
jurists and scholars have argued their “originalist” method of deciding cases 
removes judges’ personal views from the equation and produces value-neutral 
judging.13  However, given the Constitution’s purposely vague language and 
its broad, ethereal principles, it is “simply wrong to think that Supreme Court 
judges—liberal or conservative—can decide difficult constitutional cases 
without making value judgments” or inserting their personal views into the 
decision-making process.14  This Article seeks to add to the chorus of scholars 
who reject the originalism façade.  Finally, this Article argues that the Abbasi 
and Hernández decisions are two pieces in a much larger and very disturbing 
puzzle.  The Supreme Court has erected a series of unnecessary barricades 
around the federal courts, preventing plaintiffs from having their day in court, 
and preventing the courts from deciding important constitutional issues.  
These judge-made hurdles need to be removed—or at least significantly 
lowered—to ensure the people retain actual, enforceable rights.   
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part II provides a brief history of 
Bivens suits, beginning with Bivens itself and ending with the Court’s two 
most recent (and most troubling) Bivens cases: Ziglar v. Abbasi and 
Hernández v. Mesa.  Part III shows that the Court’s conservatives were not 
duty-bound to reach the results in Abbasi and Hernández; rather, they chose 
the results of these cases by using flimsy legal precepts to reach their 
predetermined outcomes.  Part IV shows how this narrow reading of Bivens 
is part of the Court’s larger effort to close the courthouse door to plaintiffs and 
to immunize government officials.  Part V responds to a pair of additional 
counterarguments that were not fully addressed in Parts I through III.  
A “permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system” is 
that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
 
 10. Id. at x.   
 11. Id.  
 12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 13. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic 
Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007) (arguing in favor of 
originalism); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (providing an overview of how 
originalism developed).   
 14. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22 (2018).   
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Constitution.”15  When James Madison presented the Bill of Rights to 
Congress in 1789, he cautioned:  
If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against 
every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will 
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.16  
Today, however, the Supreme Court acts less like an “impenetrable 
bulwark” and more like a passive observer.17  Although the political branches 
continue to exceed the bounds of the Constitution, as they always have, the 
Court’s conservative Justices often shrug their collective shoulders and allow 
unconstitutional activity to go uncorrected.  My hope is that this Article will 
persuade at least some readers that our “independent tribunals of justice” 
should reclaim their role as impenetrable constitutional bulwarks.   
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF BIVENS SUITS 
This Part proceeds in two Subparts.  Subpart A discusses Bivens and its 
progeny, beginning with Bivens itself and ending with the Court’s 2007 
decision in Wilkie v. Robbins.18  Subpart B discusses and critiques the Court’s 
two most recent Bivens cases—Ziglar v. Abbasi and Hernández v. Mesa—
which have effectively gutted Bivens beyond recognition.   
A.  Bivens and its Progeny 
1.  1971–1980: Creating and Expanding Bivens 
Since 1871, there has been a federal statute that allows citizens to sue 
state and local government officials for violating the Constitution.19  That 
statute is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20  But there is no statutory 
 
 15. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  
 16. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).   
 17. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789) (speech of James Madison), reprinted 
in 12 W. Hutchinson, W. Rachel and R. Rutland, eds., The Papers of James 
Madison 206–07 (1991). 
 18. 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 19. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854.   
 20. Section 1983, which was originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
currently provides:  
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects . . . any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
5
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counterpart that allows constitutional suits for money damages against federal 
officials.21  Accordingly, for 100 years, a victim’s ability to bring a lawsuit 
for constitutional violations largely depended on whether the offending officer 
was a state or federal actor.   
In 1971, however, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment contains an implied cause 
of action that allows aggrieved citizens to bring money-damages suits against 
federal officials for their unconstitutional behavior.22  As the Court later 
described it: “Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury 
to a constitutionally protected interest c[an] invoke the general federal 
question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary 
damages against the responsible federal official.”23  Because of this decision, 
constitutionally-based lawsuits for money damages against the federal 
government or its agents are commonly called “Bivens suits.”24   
Bivens arose from the illegal and humiliating search and seizure of 
Webster Bivens and his family.25  On November 26, 1965, several Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics agents, without a warrant, entered Bivens’s apartment 
and arrested him in front of his wife and children.26  After searching his 
apartment from “stem to stern,” the agents took Bivens to the local federal 
courthouse, where he was “interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual 
strip search.”27  After this incident, relying exclusively on the Fourth 
Amendment, Bivens filed a suit for money damages in federal court, alleging 
that he was unlawfully searched and seized and that he “suffered great 
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents’ 
 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. 
 21. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 9.1.1 at 631 (6th ed. 2012) (“No federal statute authorizes [the] 
federal courts to hear suits or give relief against federal officers who violate the 
Constitution of the United States.”); see also Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 
650 (1963) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to the federal 
government or its officers). 
 22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 395–
97 (1971); id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I am of the opinion that federal 
courts do have the power to award damages for violation of ‘constitutionally 
protected interests,’ and I agree with the Court that a traditional judicial remedy 
such as damages is appropriate to the vindication of the personal interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 23. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).  
 24. E.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation 
and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 
(2010).  
 25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.   
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
6
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unlawful conduct.”28  The agents sought to dismiss Bivens’s suit, arguing 
there was no federal law allowing suits for money damages against federal 
officers.29 
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in Bivens’s favor, finding the Fourth 
Amendment itself “gives rise to a cause of action for damages.”30  Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, reasoned that “where federally protected rights 
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will . . . 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”31  Although the 
Fourth Amendment “does not in so many words provide for its enforcement 
by an award of money damages,”32 in this case, for Bivens, “it is damages or 
nothing.”33  Accordingly, the Court concluded, Bivens should be entitled to 
money damages—the “remedial mechanism normally available [to plaintiffs] 
in the federal courts.”34 
Bivens “broke new ground” in the area of civil rights.35  Although the 
courts had long allowed suits against federal officials for injunctive relief,36 
they had never allowed implied constitutional suits for money damages.37  The 
core premise underlying Bivens was that enforcing constitutional rights is 
incredibly important—so important that it justified finding an implied cause 
of action in the Constitution itself.38  And given the Court’s reasoning and 
broad language used in Bivens, it seemed possible that this court-made 
doctrine might evolve into the federal equivalent of § 1983.39   
 
 28. Id. at 389–90.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 389.   
 31. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).  
 32. Id. at 396.  
 33. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 34. Id. at 397. 
 35. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020).  
 36. Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in 
Bivens Actions: What is Special About Special Factors, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 725–
26 (2012).  
 37. Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (noting 
that Bivens “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages 
against federal officers alleged [who] have violated a citizen’s constitutional 
rights”).   
 38. Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs 
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 25 
(2007).  
 39. Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1139–40 (2014); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the 
Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability 
Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010) (noting that it was widely assumed 
among lower courts and commentators that Bivens remedies would eventually be 
available for all constitutional rights). 
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In the decade that followed, the Court extended Bivens on two occasions.  
In 1979’s Davis v. Passman, the Court found the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause contained an implied cause of action that allowed federal 
employees to sue for wrongful, sex-based discrimination.40  There, 
Congressman Otto Passman fired his administrative assistant, Shirley Davis, 
explicitly because of her sex.41  Passman said it was “essential” that a man fill 
her position because of the “unusually heavy work load” in his office.42  Davis 
sued Passman in federal court, alleging that his explicit sex-based 
discrimination violated the Fifth Amendment and entitled her to backpay.43   
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause allows causes of action for sex-based discrimination.44  Justice 
Brennan, again writing for the Court, maintained that interpreting the Bill of 
Rights is not like interpreting a statute.45  He noted that the Constitution does 
not have the “prolixity of a legal code.”46  Rather, it is the nation’s “great 
outline” that speaks with a “majestic simplicity,”47 and it is the judiciary’s 
duty to discern the primary means by which these vague rights will be 
enforced.48  After finding that the Fifth Amendment contains an implied cause 
of action for wrongful termination, the Court went on to hold that this cause 
of action allows for money damages.49  Because money damages are the 
“ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty”50 and 
because there are “no special factors counseling hesitation” in a suit for 
 
 40. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979).   
 41. Id. at 230.   
 42. Id. at 230 n.3.  Congressman Passman terminated Ms. Davis through a 
letter, which read in part: “You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. 
Certainly you command the respect of those with whom you work; however, on 
account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the 
diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my 
Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you will agree with this conclusion.”  
Id.  Needless to say, Ms. Davis did not “agree with this conclusion.” 
 43. Id. at 231.  Normally, a suit against the government for sex-based 
discrimination would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  But because Davis’s suit was against a federal official, her suit was 
brought under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which forbids the 
federal government from denying equal protection of the law.  E.g., Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 95 n.1 (1979); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 44. Davis, 442 U.S. at 245. 
 45. Id. at 241.   
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 245.  
 50. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395).  
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wrongful termination, the Court found that money damages are “surely 
appropriate.”51  
The Court next addressed Bivens the following year in Carlson v. 
Green.52  Carlson is a pivotal and peculiar case because it both greatly 
expanded and greatly limited the availability of Bivens suits.  The Court 
expanded Bivens by holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause gives federal prisoners an implied damages remedy for 
their prison’s failure to provide adequate medical treatment.53  The Court, 
however, also placed two significant limitations on Bivens suits that had only 
been hinted at in past cases.54  These two limitations would serve as the 
foundation for Bivens’s decline.   
Carlson arose from the death of federal prison inmate Joseph Jones, Jr.55  
Despite being aware of Jones’s serious asthmatic condition, prison officials 
allegedly kept Jones in an unsafe prison environment against the advice of 
doctors.56  After Jones suffered an asthma attack, prison officials “failed to 
give him competent medical attention for some eight hours” and 
“administered contraindicated drugs [that] made his attack more severe.”57  
Jones died as a result of this asthma attack.58  Jones’s estate, through his 
mother, sued these officials for money damages, alleging their “deliberate 
indifference” to Jones’s health and safety violated the Eighth Amendment.59 
The Court, in a seven-to-two opinion, allowed the plaintiff’s Eighth 
Amendment claim for money damages to proceed.  But Justice Brennan, yet 
again writing for the Court, began the opinion in a somewhat curious way—
by noting when Bivens suits are not available.60  Justice Brennan noted that 
Bivens suits are unavailable in two circumstances: (1) when there are “special 
factors counseling hesitation”; and (2) when Congress has provided an 
“equally effective” alternative remedy that was clearly meant to supplant 
 
 51. Id.  Justice Brennan noted that a sex-based termination claim under the 
Fifth Amendment is not meaningfully different from a Title VII suit, where the 
courts routinely award money damages.  Id.  As such, in a case like this, where “it 
is damages or nothing,” the courts are obliged to afford a damages remedy.  Id.   
 52. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).  
 53. Id. at 18–19, 25.  Prisoner suits make up a considerable portion of the 
federal courts’ dockets, so allowing federal prisoners to bring comparable suits 
had significant consequences.  See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 1–5 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that over 14,000 
prisoner suits were filed in 1999). 
 54. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19.  
 55. Id. at 17.   
 56. Id at 17 n.1.   
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. See id.   
 60. Id. at 18–19.  
9
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Bivens.61  The Court had hinted at these limitations in past cases,62 but it had 
never explicitly stated that these were hard-and-fast limitations on Bivens 
suits.  Although the Court found that these limitations did not apply to the 
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment suit, its discussion of these two exceptions laid 
the groundwork for Bivens’s decline.  
2.  1980–2007: Limiting Bivens 
After 1980, the Court began to consistently and repeatedly retreat from 
Bivens, using the two exceptions provided in Carlson.63  In Bush v. Lucas, for 
example, the Court found the existence of an alternative administrative 
remedy foreclosed a Bivens suit.64  In Bush, a NASA aerospace engineer 
alleged he was demoted for making critical statements about the agency.65  
Bush later appealed his demotion to the Civil Service Commission, alleging 
his demotion violated the First Amendment.66  While this appeal was pending, 
however, Bush also filed a Bivens suit.67  The district court dismissed Bush’s 
suit, finding that the Civil Service Commission’s appeals process was an 
adequate alternative remedy, thereby barring Bush’s Bivens claim.68   
The Supreme Court agreed.  Although the Court assumed that (a) Bush’s 
First Amendment rights were violated, (b) the Civil Service Commission’s 
remedies were not as effective as a Bivens money-damages remedy, and (c) 
Congress had not foreclosed Bivens suits in this area,69 the Court nonetheless 
found that the existence of a comprehensive, administrative remedial scheme 
precluded an implied First Amendment cause of action.70  In Carlson, the 
Court held that an alternative remedial scheme would preclude a Bivens suit 
 
 61. Id.  
 62. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (“[I]n appropriate 
circumstances, a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the 
violation of constitutional rights if there are ‘no special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’”); Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (“In Bivens, the Court…looked for ‘special 
factors counseling hesitation.’ Absent congressional authorization, a court may 
also be impelled to think more carefully about whether the type of injury sustained 
by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 63. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–57 (2017); see also George 
Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have the Bivens 
Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 275 (1989) (arguing that the Court’s 1983 
decision in Bush v. Lucas represented a significant retreat from Bivens). 
 64. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 388–90 (1983).  
 65. Id. at 369.  
 66. Id. at 370–71. 
 67. Id. at 371. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 372–73.  
 70. Id. at 368, 388–90.  
10
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only if the scheme was as “equally effective” as a Bivens suit.71  The Bush 
Court, however, seemingly rejected this high standard, noting that Congress 
could foreclose the possibility of a Bivens suit simply by providing any 
reasonable alternative remedy.72  The mere existence of an alternate remedial 
scheme approved by Congress, in other words, is a “special factor counseling 
hesitation” that precludes a Bivens suit. 
The Court continued its Bivens retreat in Schweiker v. Chilicky, where 
the Court again found that the existence of a congressionally created remedial 
scheme precluded a Bivens cause of action.73  In the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration illegally disqualified a large number of citizens from receiving 
their Social Security benefits.74  Pursuant to an ill-conceived “continuing 
disability review” program, the Social Security Administration wrongfully 
discontinued disability benefits for roughly 200,000 people.75  In response, 
Congress passed emergency legislation to stop the disqualifications.76  James 
Chilicky was among those whose disability benefits were wrongly denied, 
causing him to suffer months of financial and medical hardship.77  Chilicky 
filed a Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
seeking money damages for the “emotional distress” and “loss of food [and] 
shelter” that resulted from the Social Security Administration’s wrongful 
denial of benefits.78   
On appeal, the Court prevented Chilicky’s claim from proceeding.79  
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor noted that, since Carlson, the 
 
 71. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).  
 72. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 (“When Congress provides an alternative 
remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by clear 
legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court’s 
power should not be exercised.”); id. at 388 (“[W]hether an elaborate remedial 
system…should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the 
constitutional violation at issue…obviously cannot be answered simply by noting 
that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff.”).  See also 
Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
Civil Service Reform Act forecloses Bivens suits, even if its remedies are not as 
effective as a Bivens suit for money damages).  
 73. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423–25 (1988).  For a deeper dive 
into Chilicky, see Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages 
Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 (1989). 
 74. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 416, 418. 
 75. Id. at 415–16.  
 76. Id. at 415.  
 77. Id. at 417–18.   
 78. Id. at 418–19.  Among other things, Chilicky alleged that the higher-ups 
at the Social Security Administration had “adopted illegal policies that led to the 
wrongful termination of benefits” and “used an impermissible quota system” that 
required state agencies to terminate a predetermined number of recipients.  Id.   
 79. Id. at 423–25.  
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Court had been hesitant to extend Bivens “into new contexts.”80  The Court 
again noted several “special factors” that weighed against allowing Chilicky’s 
Bivens suit to proceed.81  Most significantly, the Chilicky Court found that 
Congress’s silence was evidence that it did not want to allow Bivens suits in 
this context: “When the design of a [g]overnment program suggests that 
Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we 
have not created additional Bivens remedies.”82  
This was a striking departure from the reasoning seen in Bivens, Davis, 
and Carlson.  In Davis and Carlson, the Court found that Bivens suits were 
appropriate because Congress had not expressly disapproved of such causes 
of action (i.e., Congress’s silence suggested that a Bivens-like remedy was 
appropriate).83  In Bush and Chilicky, however, the Court found the exact 
opposite: that Bivens suits were inappropriate because Congress had not 
expressly approved of them (i.e., Congress’s silence indicated that a Bivens-
like remedy was inappropriate).84  Bush and Chilicky, thus, show that the 
existence of any congressionally-created remedial scheme will preclude a 
related Bivens action unless Congress explicitly approves of such suits.85 
Between the Court’s decision in Chilicky and its 2017 ruling in Ziglar v. 
Abbasi (discussed below), the Court further limited Bivens suits in three 
significant ways: (1) it barred any Bivens suits arising out of military service; 
(2) it barred Bivens suits against private entities that were under contract with 
the federal government; and (3) it required the courts to determine whether a 
new type of Bivens suit is, on balance, desirable.86 
 
 80. Id. at 421.  
 81. Id. at 423.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (holding that a Bivens suit was 
allowable because there was  “no explicit congressional declaration that persons 
injured by federal officers’ violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover 
money damages from the agents, but [instead] must be remitted to another 
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228, 246–47 (1979) (holding that a Bivens action was allowable because there was 
“‘no explicit congressional declaration that persons’ in petitioner’s position 
injured by unconstitutional federal employment discrimination ‘may not recover 
money damages from’ those responsible for the injury” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. 
at 397)).  
 84. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983).  
 85. See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423 (“When the design of a Government 
program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial 
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its 
administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”).  
 86. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1 at 
648–51, 653–54 (6th ed. 2012).   
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The Court has categorically prevented Bivens suits arising out of military 
service.87  In United States v. Stanley, for example, the Court barred a United 
States service member’s lawsuit for the injuries he allegedly suffered as part 
of the military’s forced LSD experiments.88  The Stanley Court blanketly 
declared that “no Bivens remedy is available for injuries that ‘arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to [military] service.’”89  Military service, 
in other words, is another “special factor counseling hesitation” that prohibits 
a Bivens suit.90 
The Court also disallowed Bivens suits against private entities in the 
2001 case,  Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.91  In Malesko, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons contracted with a private company to operate a halfway 
house.92  John Malesko was an inmate at this halfway house.93  The halfway 
house’s staff was aware that Malesko suffered from a serious heart 
condition.94  On one occasion, however, a halfway house guard refused to let 
Malesko use the elevator to reach his fifth-floor room.95  Malesko protested 
that he was specially permitted to use the elevator because of his heart 
condition, but the guard was “adamant” that Malesko use the stairs.96  Malesko 
suffered a heart attack while climbing the stairs, and he later sued the halfway 
house for his injuries.97 
In a five-to-four opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court 
held that private entities may not be sued under Bivens.98  The primary purpose 
of Bivens remedies, Rehnquist reasoned, was to deter “individual [federal] 
officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing.”99  To extend Bivens 
to suits against agencies and private companies, he continued, would not 
further this underlying purpose.100  As such, given the Court’s “caution toward 
 
 87. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987).   
 88. Id. at 671–72.  
 89. Id. at 684 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).   
 90. Id. at 683 (holding that the “the unique disciplinary structure of the 
Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field,” is a “special factor[] 
counseling hesitation” that “require[s] abstention”).  Scholars have widely 
criticized the Court’s decision in Stanley.  See, e.g., Barry Kellman, Judicial 
Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But Who is to Guard the Guards 
Themselves?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597 (1989); Johnathan Tomes, Feres to Chappell 
to Stanley: Three Strikes and Service Members Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 
(1990).  
 91. Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001).  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 64.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 63. 
 99. Id. at 74.  
 100. Id.  
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extending Bivens remedies into any new context,” the Court refused to extend 
Bivens to suits against private companies.101   
Finally, in 2007’s Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court added another limitation 
on Bivens suits: when presented with a Bivens suit in a new context, the courts 
must determine whether the suit, on balance, is desirable.102  Robbins arose 
from a property dispute between a Wyoming rancher and the federal Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”).103  The BLM failed to record an easement on 
a large piece of private property in Wyoming.104  Frank Robbins subsequently 
purchased that property, vitiating the government’s easement; and when the 
BLM realized its mistake, it demanded that Robbins recognize the federal 
government’s unrecorded easement.105  When Robbins refused, “BLM 
officials mounted a seven-year campaign of relentless harassment and 
intimidation to force Robbins to give in.”106  This harassment campaign 
included “intentionally trespassing on Robbins’s land, inciting a neighbor to 
ram a truck into Robbins while he was on horseback, breaking into his guest 
lodge, filing trumped-up felony charges against him without probable cause, 
and pressuring other government agents to impound Robbins’s cattle without 
cause.”107   
In response to this harassment campaign, Robbins eventually filed a 
Bivens action against the BLM officers under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.108  The Robbins Court seemingly recognized that a Bivens-type 
lawsuit was the only way to meaningfully vindicate Robbins’s rights.109  
 
 101. Id. (emphasis added).  Although the Malesko Court emphasized that the 
“core purpose” of Bivens is to “deter[] individual [federal] officers from engaging 
in unconstitutional wrongdoing,” the Court later refused to allow Bivens suits 
against individual prison guards at a private prison. See id.; contra Minneci v. 
Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 120 (2012).  When these Bivens case are viewed 
holistically, they are infuriating, because the Court is clearly just making it up as 
it goes.  There is no principled reason for these rulings, and the Court consistently 
talks out of both sides of its mouth.  This area of law is a muddled mess to say the 
least.  
 102. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550, 554 (2007).  
 103. Id. at 541–42.  
 104. Id. at 542.  
 105. Id.  Because Robbins was a bona fide purchaser—i.e., he was unaware of 
the federal government’s easement when he purchased the land and the easement 
had not been recorded—the government lost the ability to record its easement 
once Robbins purchased the property, and Robbins acquired title free and clear of 
the government’s easement.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-120 (2005).   
 106. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 568 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting in part).   
 107. See Tribe, supra note 38, at 29 (citing multiple pleadings, briefs, and 
opinions from the Robbins case) (footnotes omitted). 
 108. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 547–48. 
 109. See id. at 554 (describing the ‘‘forums of defense and redress open to 
Robbins’’ as ‘‘a patchwork, an assemblage of state and federal, administrative 
and judicial benches applying regulations, statutes and common law rules’’).  The 
14
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However, the Court nonetheless precluded Robbins’s suit, reasoning that 
allowing a Bivens suit in this context could lead to a wave of litigation and 
because of the difficulty of proving whether federal officers were acting with 
a retaliatory motive.110  Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held that the 
courts must weigh the general reasons for and against creating a new type of 
Bivens suit, while “paying particular heed . . . to any special factors counseling 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”111  Robbins, 
thus, “transform[ed] the Bivens presumption in favor of a federal cause of 
action into a general, all-things-considered, balancing test.”112   
As Professor Laurence Tribe has recognized, the Robbins Court 
“departed from the core premise of Bivens—that the importance of 
constitutional rights justified implying a cause of action directly from the 
Constitution.”113  Robbins was different from the Court’s prior anti-Bivens 
decisions because in those cases the plaintiff had an alternative form of 
recourse.114  In Robbins, however, the plaintiff had no form of recourse that 
“would operate to deter that kind of violation or at least redress it when 
deterrence failed.”115   
B.  The Roberts Court Guts Bivens 
The Court’s post-Carlson trend of limiting Bivens at every turn came to 
a head in 2017’s Ziglar v. Abbasi and 2020’s Hernández v. Mesa, where the 
Court essentially limited Bivens, Davis, and Carlson to their facts.  The 
plaintiffs’ allegations in Abbasi and Hernández were truly disturbing—and 
they touched on some of the most foundational principles underlying our 
system of limited government.  Yet the Court refused to extend Bivens in these 
cases.  Because the Court was unwilling to extend Bivens to the “new 
contexts” presented in Abbasi and Hernández, it seems safe to say that the 
Roberts Court’s conservative majority is unwilling to extend Bivens under any 
circumstances.  
1.  Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017) 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government 
detained hundreds of Muslim-American immigrants who were “of 
 
Court surely took a large step back from Bivens in this case, as the “patchwork” 
of remedies available to Robbins, were surely available to the plaintiffs in Bivens, 
Davis, and Carlson as well.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 556–58, 569.   
 111. Id. at 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)) (emphasis 
added).  
 112. Tribe, supra note 38, at 25.   
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 25, 67–68.  
 115. Id. at 25.  
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interest.”116  Eighty-four of these detainees were held, without bail, at a 
detention center in Brooklyn, New York, where they were repeatedly strip-
searched, verbally abused, tortured, and humiliated.117  Their bones were 
broken.118  They were not allowed to have basic hygiene products, like 
toothbrushes or soap.119  They were kept in small cells for over twenty-three 
hours a day.120  And their religious beliefs and practices were prohibited and 
belittled.121  After eight months of confinement and mistreatment, these 
detainees were released and deported.122  
The detainees eventually filed suit, alleging the government “had no 
reason to suspect them of any connection to terrorism, and thus had no 
legitimate reason to hold them for so long in these harsh conditions.”123  
Among others, these detainees sued three high-ranking federal officials: 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director 
Robert Mueller, and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar.124  
The detainees alleged that these officials implemented and oversaw a policy 
that was designed to imprison and torture Muslims without adequate cause in 
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.125 
The detainees’ suit made it to the Supreme Court for the first time in 
2009, where the Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, completely recalibrated the 
federal courts’ pleading standard to shield these federal officials from civil 
liability.126  After amending their complaint to comply with Iqbal’s new 
pleading standard, the detainees’ suit again reached the Supreme Court in 
Abbasi. 
In a four-to-two decision,127 the Abbasi Court held that the detainees’ 
Bivens suit against these high-ranking federal officials could not proceed.128  
Before dismissing the detainees’ Bivens suit, however, the Court went on a 
full-blown, anti-Bivens tirade.129  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
 
 116. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2017).   
 117. Id. at 1852–53.   
 118. Id. at 1853.  
 119. Id.   
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1853–54.   
 126. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding, contrary 
to existing precedent, that federal trial courts must disregard all conclusory, 
implausible allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint when addressing a motion to 
dismiss).  
 127. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch did not participate in Abbasi.  
Per 28 U.S.C. § 1, only six Justices are required to reach a quorum and decide a 
case.   
 128. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.  
 129. Cf. id. at 1855–59.  
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noted that the Court had previously “followed a different approach to 
recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now.”130  “During this 
ancien regime,” Justice Kennedy recounted, “the Court assumed it to be a 
proper judicial function to provide such remedies as are necessary to make 
effective a statute’s purpose.”131  Today, however, the Court uses a “far more 
cautious course before finding implied causes of action” and views Bivens 
remedies as “a disfavored judicial activity.”132  The four-Justice Abbasi 
majority then articulated an entirely new framework for addressing Bivens 
suits.133   
When asked to extend Bivens, the Court now engages in a two-step 
inquiry.  First, the Court must determine whether the proposed Bivens suit 
arises in a “new context” (i.e., whether the proposed case is “different in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases”).134  To make things as 
confusing as possible, the Court provided a seven-part, non-exhaustive, non-
dispositive, disjunctive, multi-factor test to determine whether a case might 
arise in a new context:  
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of [1] the rank of the 
officers involved; [2] the constitutional right at issue; [3] the generality 
or specificity of the official action; [4] the extent of judicial guidance 
as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be 
confronted; [5] the statutory or other legal mandate under which the 
officer was operating; [6] the risk of disruptive intrusion by the 
Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or [7] the presence of 
potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.135 
If the context is not new, the case may proceed.  But if the case arises in a new 
context, the Court will go on to step two.   
Second, if the context is new, the Court must determine whether “any 
special factors” advise against extending Bivens into the context presented.136  
Although the Abbasi Court did not endeavor to “create an exhaustive list” of 
special factors, it mentioned that the lower courts should look to (a) whether 
 
 130. Id. at 1855.   
 131. Id.  If anyone reading this footnote can think of a more pretentious and 
ridiculous phrase than “ancien regime” to refer to the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s, 
please email your submissions to alindval@asu.edu. 
 132. Id. at 1855, 1857.  
 133. For a law-school-outline-style flowchart of the Court’s new Bivens 
framework announced in Abbasi, see Alexander J. Lindvall, New Contexts and 
Special Factors: The Court’s New Bivens Framework, 43 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 63, 78–80 (2020).  
 134. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.   
 135. Id. at 1859–60.  Given this list, the Court might as well have said, “If the 
case isn’t identical to Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, dismiss the suit.”   
 136. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1857).  
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“there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or 
necessity of a damages remedy” and (b) “whether the Judiciary is well suited, 
absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and 
benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”137  If the Court finds any 
sort of “special factors” weighing against the Bivens suit, the suit should be 
dismissed.  
The Abbasi Court found the detainees’ suit arose in a new context, and 
that there were special factors counseling against the suit (i.e., the Court found 
the detainees’ Bivens suit was inappropriate and not allowed).138  The context 
was “new,” the Court held, because the detainees were challenging “the 
confinement conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level 
executive policy created in the wake of a major terrorist attack on American 
soil,” which was markedly different than the claims seen in Bivens.139  
Additionally, the Court held that four “special factors” counseled against the 
detainees’ Bivens suit: (i) the civil litigation in this case (meaning discovery) 
would require the courts to inappropriately interfere with the sensitive 
functions of the Executive; (ii) the unprecedented events of September 11th 
required the courts to defer to the political branches; (iii) Congress is silent on 
the issue, which should give the courts pause; and (iv) if the plaintiffs were to 
succeed in this case, it could uproot major Executive policies, and Bivens is 
not the appropriate vehicle for major policy changes.140  Accordingly, because 
these “special factors” arose in a new Bivens context, the detainees’ suit was 
not allowed.   
Scholars have widely panned the Court’s decision in Abbasi.  Professor 
Benjamin Zipursky, for example, argues Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in 
Abbasi “reflects an untenably narrow conception of the place of private rights 
of action in our legal system.”141  Professor Jules Lobel argues that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion is “at odds with the basic precepts of the framers’ view of 
the judicial role.”142  But these scholars miss a much larger point: the Abbasi 
decision is completely inconsistent with our nation’s most cherished values.  
This decision is revolting—in the same ballpark as Korematsu.143 
 
 137. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.  
 138. Id. at 1860, 1862–63.  
 139. Id. at 1860.  
 140. Id. at 1860–63.  
 141. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to 
Redress, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167, 2169 (2018).  
 142. Jules Lobel, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise of Accountability, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2149, 2160–66 (2018) (arguing that multiple cases from early 
American history “demonstrate that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar is at odds 
with the basic precepts of the framers’ view of the judicial role in addressing 
official claims of necessity during serious crises” and the “Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s perspective was the exact opposite of Kennedy’s” in Abbasi).   
 143. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (green-lighting 
the forced internment of Japanese-Americans due to nondescript and unproven 
“national defense and safety” concerns).  
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Take this decision out of the context of the Court’s confusing, 
inconsistent Bivens decisions and ask yourself the following question: Should 
the federal government be able to round-up, jail, and torture religious 
minorities without any specter of civil liability?  Your answer, hopefully, was 
a resounding “no.”  But that was the real issue in Abbasi.  The narrow, esoteric 
Bivens question can be pushed aside; the broad underlying question is what 
really mattered.  Abbasi, at a certain level, was about what kind of country we 
are going to live in.  And to the Abbasi majority, it is a country where the 
federal government can jail and torture people because of their religion and 
national origin without consequences.   
At the end of the day, results matter.  When dealing with the Court’s 
weird, meandering Bivens decisions, it is easy to get lost in the weeds; but it 
is important to never lose sight of the fact that the Constitution is “intended to 
preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.”144  The 
Abbasi Court seemingly lost sight of this promise and brought the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments that much closer to being nothing but “paper rights.”145  
The broad issue presented in Abbasi (whether the government should be 
able to jail and torture people based on their religion) was so integral to our 
system of government and what it means to be American that the Court could 
not afford to get it wrong.  But it did.  And not only did the Court dismiss this 
meritorious Bivens suit, but it provided a framework for barring any future 
Bivens suits as well.  Hernández v. Mesa illustrates this point. 
2.  Hernández v. Mesa (2020) 
Along the United States-Mexico border, there is a large concrete culvert 
that separates El Paso, Texas, and Juarez, Mexico.146  On June 7, 2010, Sergio 
Hernández, a fifteen-year-old Mexican citizen, and several of his friends were 
playing in this culvert.147  At one point, a few of the kids, including 
Hernández, ran up the culvert and crossed into United States territory.148  
Noticing that the boys had crossed into U.S. territory, Border Patrol Officer 
Jesus Mesa detained one of the boys, at which point the other boys fled back 
 
 144. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904) (per Holmes, J.).  
 145. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Ashbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 
514 (1942) (“The Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial 
rights, not to maintain theories. Particularly in a case like this are we in the realm 
of actualities and not of abstractions and paper rights…” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  
 146. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020).  
 147. Id.  Officer Mesa disputed that the boys were simply “playing” in the 
culvert; he apparently believed that the boys were “involved in an illegal border 
crossing attempt” and that they “pelted him with rocks.”  Id.  However, because 
this case was appealed to the Court on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ factual 
allegations were required to be accepted as true.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007).   
 148. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.   
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into Mexico.149  As Hernández ran back across the culvert into Mexico, 
Officer Mesa, “seemingly taking careful aim,” shot Hernández in the back of 
the head, killing him.150  Officer Mesa’s bullet crossed the U.S.-Mexico 
border and struck Hernández while he was standing on Mexican soil.151 
Hernández’s parents subsequently brought a Bivens suit against Mesa, 
alleging that Mesa violated their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.152  
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.153  The Supreme Court was originally set to decide this case in 2017 
but remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit so it could reevaluate the case in 
light of the Court’s Abbasi decision.154  On remand, the Fifth Circuit 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ case, relying on the Court’s Abbasi framework.155 
Following Abbasi’s two-step approach, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-
four ruling, held that Bivens did not extend to a cross-border shooting because 
of the potential “foreign relations” and “national security” implications that 
could arise if the suit was allowed to proceed.156  Justice Alito, writing for the 
majority, started by noting that Bivens remedies are the exception, not the 
rule.157  Although the Court used to “routinely infer[] causes of action” that 
“were not explicit in the text of the provision that was allegedly violated,”158 
the Hernández Court made clear that those days were long gone.159  Over the 
last forty years, Justice Alito noted, the Court has “c[o]me to appreciate more 
fully the tension between [inferring causes of action] and the Constitution’s 
separation of legislative and judicial power.”160  By inferring causes of action, 
Justice Alito argued, the Court had been improperly stepping on Congress’s 
toes.  And the Court even went so far as to note that if Bivens had been decided 
today, “it is doubtful that [the Court] would have reached the same result.”161   
The Court, however, again stopped short of overruling Bivens and 
instead made clear that constitutionally-based suits against federal officials 
may proceed only if the facts of the case are virtually identical to the facts 
 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 151. Id. at 740 (majority opinion). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. (citing Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017)).  
 155. Id. at 741.  
 156. Id. at 744, 746.  
 157. Id. at 741–42.   
 158. Id. at 741 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)).  
 159. See id at 741–44 (noting that the Court has “c[o]me to appreciate more 
fully the tension” that Bivens, Davis, and Carlson placed on the Constitution, and 
that if these three cases had been decided today, “it is doubtful that [the Court] 
would have reached the same result.”).  
 160. Id. at 741.  
 161. Id. at 742–43.  
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seen in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson.162  Using new, broader language than that 
seen in Abbasi, the Court held that a plaintiff’s Bivens suit should be dismissed 
if the court has any “reason to pause” when determining whether Bivens 
should apply.163 
Hernández is troubling for many reasons.  First and foremost, it is an 
extreme example of the Court shirking its duty to enforce the Constitution.  
For many people whose constitutional rights are violated, “it is damages or 
nothing.”164  Acting under the centuries-old assumption that “for every right, 
there should be a remedy,”165 the Bivens Court took it upon itself to ensure the 
Bill of Rights would be more than “mere demarcation on parchment.”166  But 
to the Court’s current conservative majority, whether a suit for money 
damages is allowed—and, accordingly, whether the Constitution is being 
properly enforced—is beyond the Court’s purview.167  The Court’s current 
“don’t look at me, I just work here” attitude is extremely worrisome to say the 
least. 
It is astonishing to see how far the Court has strayed from its early Bivens 
decisions.  In Carlson, the plaintiff had an alternative remedy under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), but the Court nonetheless found that this 
did not preclude a Bivens suit because the FTCA, unlike Bivens, didn’t allow 
for punitive damages.168  In stark contrast, in Hernández, it was undisputed 
that the plaintiffs, left with a dead child, had no form of relief other than a 
Bivens suit,169 yet the Court left them out to dry.  As Chief Justice Marshall 
stated long ago: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.”170  The Court’s recent Bivens decisions seem to lack any 
“essence of civil liberty.”   
 
 162. See id. at 743 (holding that the courts should reject a plaintiff’s Bivens 
suit whenever it has “reason to pause” about whether Bivens should apply).   
 163. Id.  If I were a betting man (which I am), I would bet this “reason to 
pause” language is going to be the most cited phrase from Hernández and will be 
quoted in nearly every motion to dismiss and order of dismissal going forward.   
 164. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 165. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 599–605 (3d. ed. 
2000) (discussing the constitutional presumption that “for every right, there 
should be a remedy”); see also Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 
(1916) (“So, in every case, where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the 
benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing 
enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary 
to the said law. This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.” 
(internal quotes omitted)). 
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).  
 167. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750.   
 168. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20–21 (1980).  
 169. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 170. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
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The core assumption underlying Bivens was that the “importance of 
[enforcing] constitutional rights justified implying a cause of action directly 
from the Constitution.”171  The Hernández majority “not in so many words”172 
rejected this assumption.  To the Hernández majority, it was more important 
to show extreme deference to Congress and the Executive than to ensure 
individual rights are meaningfully vindicated.  This value judgment is very 
misguided.  Our Constitution is supposed to be “the greatest document ever 
struck off by the . . . pen of man.”173  The entire point of the Constitution was 
to create a system of government that would maximize the people’s safety and 
happiness.174  It promises to confer actual, enforceable rights, not theoretical 
rights.175  It promises to establish justice.176  It promises to promote the 
people’s general welfare.177  And it promises to secure liberty.178  Hernández 
fails to fulfill any of these promises.  
Second, the Court’s reasoning in Hernández is incredibly flimsy.  
According to the Hernández majority, the plaintiffs’ Bivens suit was 
inappropriate because of its “foreign relations” and “national security” 
implications.179  However, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissenting 
opinion, the plaintiffs complained of only “the rogue actions of a rank-and-
file law enforcement officer,” whose conduct had little to no bearing on U.S. 
foreign policy.180  “[N]o policies or policymakers [were] challenged,”181 and 
the Mexican government explicitly wanted the plaintiffs’ suit to proceed.182  
The Mexican government’s amicus brief, in fact, warned that declining to hear 
the case “is what has the potential to negatively affect international 
relations.”183  Phrased slightly differently: allowing the U.S. government to 
 
 171. Tribe, supra note 38, at 25. 
 172. Compare with, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).  
 173. Thurman W. Arnold, Apologia for Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L.J. 729, 746 
(1935).  
 174. See, e.g., Gary L. Young, When Rights Clash: Applying Our Principled 
and Prudential Constitution, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 61, 84 (1996) (arguing that the 
actual form our government takes is merely “a prudential matter,” which is 
“subservient to the People’s interests in safety and happiness”) (emphasis altered).   
 175. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Ashbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 
514 (1942) (“The Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial 
rights, not to maintain theories.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 176. U.S. Const. Preamble.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 744, 746 (2020).  
 180. Id. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 758.  
 183. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of the Government of the 
United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Hernández 
v. Mesa 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (2019 WL 3776030)).  
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kill Mexican citizens without consequences is far more likely to negatively 
affect U.S.-Mexican relations than allowing the plaintiffs’ Bivens suit to 
proceed.   
Additionally, the Hernández majority stressed that courts should not 
extend U.S. law to conduct that happened “abroad.”184  But, again, this makes 
no sense; the plaintiffs were attempting to apply U.S. law in a U.S. court to a 
U.S. citizen who was employed by the U.S. government for conduct 
committed on U.S. soil.  The majority never persuasively explains how 
allowing the plaintiffs’ suit to proceed would improperly extend U.S. law 
abroad.  The Court instead, as it has seemingly done in the past, played its 
“national security” trump card, allowing it to reach a heartless and 
unjustifiable result while acting like its hands were tied.185   
If Hernández is boiled down to its essentials, the Court’s conservative 
majority allowed an agent of the federal government to escape liability for 
shooting an unarmed child in the back, simply because the agent’s bullet 
happened to land a few feet on the wrong side of an imaginary line.  This is 
not a persuasive reason to limit the reach of the Bill of Rights.  In Bivens and 
Hernández, the Court faced the same choice: allow the plaintiff to receive 
“damages,” or “nothing.”186  In Bivens, the Court chose damages; in 
Hernández, the Court chose nothing.  For this reason, Hernández, perhaps 
more than any other decision, raises serious questions about the Court’s 
ability—or at least willingness—to do justice.   
Third, the Court seems to be inching toward prohibiting Bivens suits 
entirely.  Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hernández is an anti-Bivens tour 
de force—where he even went so far as to claim that Bivens would have been 
 
 184. Id. at 747–49 (majority opinion). 
 185. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409, 2419–20 (2018) 
(allowing the Trump administration, with virtually no evidence, to ban Muslim-
Americans from traveling to the U.S. because of alleged “national security” risks); 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861–62 (2017) (immunizing high-ranking 
federal officials from a Bivens suit because of alleged, but completely unproven, 
national security concerns); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–41 (2015) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the federal government’s mere citation to 
a national-security-related statute, without more, allows the it to deny an 
immigrant’s visa application); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306–10 (1981) 
(allowing the Executive Branch to revoke an American citizen’s passport because 
of alleged, but by no means proven, “national security” concerns); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (allowing the forced internment of 
Japanese-Americans due to nondescript and unproven “national defense and 
safety” concerns); see also Al-Aulaqui v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D. D.C. 
2010) (allowing the Obama administration, without going through the normal 
channels of due process, to kill a U.S. citizen living abroad because of hazy 
national security allegations).  
 186. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
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decided differently had the Roberts Court heard it.187  And two Justices—
Thomas and Gorsuch—informed all interested attorneys that they are standing 
at the ready to “abandon the [Bivens] doctrine altogether.”188  The Roberts 
Court made clear in Hernández that it is ready to explicitly overrule Bivens, 
Davis, and Carlson.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning as an aside that Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in Hernández is remarkably condescending.  The idea that the Court 
simply “came to appreciate . . . the tension between [Bivens] and the 
Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power”189 is ridiculous.  
This implies that Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, Douglas, Harlan, 
Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—all of 
whom have voted to allow and extend Bivens suits—were incapable of 
appreciating and balancing “the Constitution’s separation of legislative and 
judicial power.”190  Justice Alito also seems to suggest that Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins191 shows that Bivens was incorrectly decided.192  But Erie was 
decided thirty-three years before Bivens, and Justice Brennan, Bivens’s 
author, was certainly more than aware of Erie’s reach, given the fact that he 
authored some of the seminal cases on choice-of-law in diversity cases.193   
“Cases that get distinguished often enough are commonly said to die—
or at least to suffer near-death experiences.”194  Between 1980 and 2020, 
 
 187. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742–43 (majority opinion).  
 188. Id. at 752–53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The analysis 
underlying Bivens cannot be defended. We have cabined the doctrine’s scope, 
undermined its foundation, and limited its precedential value. It is time to correct 
this Court’s error and abandon the doctrine altogether.”).   
 189. Id. at 741 (majority opinion).  
 190. Cf. id.  
 191. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 192. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (“[Separation-of-powers] problem[s] 
do[] not exist when a common-law court, which exercises a degree of lawmaking 
authority, fleshes out the remedies available for a common-law tort. 
Analogizing Bivens to the work of a common-law court, petitioners and some of 
their amici make much of the fact that common-law claims against federal 
officers for intentional torts were once available. But Erie held that ‘[t]here is no 
federal general common law,’ and therefore federal courts today cannot fashion 
new claims in the way that they could before 1938.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 193. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-Op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 
(1958) (per Brennan, J.).  Justice Alito’s Erie argument is ridiculous.  The Erie 
doctrine is meant to (i) discourage forum shopping and (ii) avoid inequitable 
administration of the law.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  Justice 
Alito does not explain how Bivens suits harm either of these goals.  In fact, I would 
argue that disallowing Bivens suits leads to inequitable administration of the law, 
as a victim’s right to redress depends almost entirely on whether the defendant 
was a state or federal official.  
 194. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 101 
(2016). 
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Bivens suffered over a dozen near-death experiences.  The Court’s newfound 
reluctance to enforce the Constitution shows that Bivens, Davis, and Carlson 
have “slowly become mere ghosts of their former selves, barely clinging to 
existence.”195  Bivens’s death, it seems, may be on the horizon.   
III.  THE COURT CHOSE THE RESULTS IN ABBASI AND HERNÁNDEZ 
This Part makes one large point and three related subpoints.  The large 
point: originalism is a sham.  Conservative judges, just like their liberal 
counterparts, choose the outcomes of difficult cases to suit their own 
predilections.  This Part makes this main point by making three subpoints: (A) 
nearly every constitutional provision is susceptible to multiple, equally 
plausible interpretations, and judges are forced to make personal value 
judgments when deciding tough cases; (B) conservative judges use history as 
a smokescreen to decide cases in a way that matches their personal 
preferences, picking and choosing from a seemingly unlimited number of 
historical sources to support their predetermined outcome; and (C) 
conservative judges often choose heartless and unacceptable results.   
A.  Nearly Every Constitutional Provision is Susceptible to Multiple 
Plausible Interpretations 
At a gut level, there is clearly something wrong with the Court’s Abbasi 
and Hernández decisions.  The Court, after all, allowed federal officials to 
imprison, torture, and kill racial and ethnic minorities without any specter of 
civil liability.  And as the dissenting Justices made clear in these cases, the 
Court surely could have reached the opposite conclusion without disrupting 
our system of checks and balances or inappropriately interfering with foreign 
policy.196   
But defenders of these decisions argue the Court was dutybound to reach 
these results.197  The Court’s conservatives were simply “enforcing the 
Constitution as written,” the platitude goes.  The Abbasi and Hernández 
majorities were distilling the “meaning of the [Constitution] as understood at 
 
 195. Constitutional Remedies—Bivens Actions—Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2017) (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 199 
(1956)). 
 196. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. at 1876–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 197. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 751–53 (Thomas, J., concurring); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Justices Make the Tough—But Right—Call in Cross-Border 
Shooting Case, THE HILL, Feb. 28, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-
justice/484866-justices-make-the-tough-but-right-call-in-cross-border-shooting-
case [https://perma.cc/P353-PZFV] (“At bottom, this case was not about whether 
Hernández’s family deserves an avenue for seeking redress for the alleged 
violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, it is about the 
power of federal courts to provide a remedy where Congress has provided none.”).  
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the time of [its] ratification,” and these rulings were “entirely distinct from 
[the Justices’] individual preferences.”198 
To quote originalism’s patron saint, Justice Scalia, this argument is “pure 
applesauce.”199  When addressing fuzzy, open-ended constitutional questions, 
there is no one, objectively correct legal answer.  Long ago, Chief Justice John 
Marshall reminded us that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we 
are expounding,” a Constitution “intended to endure for ages to come.”200  
“The framers of the Constitution,” in other words, “wisely spoke in general 
language and left to succeeding generations the task of applying that language 
to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live.”201 
The Fourth Amendment, for example, protects the people from 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.202  But deciding whether a police 
officer’s conduct was “unreasonable” requires a judge to make a value 
judgment and rely on their own understanding of reasonable conduct.  Justice 
Thomas, to be sure, has a different understanding of “reasonable” police 
behavior than Justice Sotomayor.203  Is looking through a suspect’s cellphone 
after an arrest reasonable?204  Is placing a GPS tracker on a suspect’s vehicle 
 
 198. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, 
Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a 
“Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1494 (2012) (reciting 
originalism’s typical mantra); See also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007) 
(same); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (providing an overview of how originalism developed).   
 199. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 507 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 200. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819) (emphasis in 
original).  
 201. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693, 694 (1976).   
 202. U.S. Const. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated…”); see also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006) (noting that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness’”).  
 203. Compare Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2196–98 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing it is reasonable for 
the police to administer a warrantless blood-draw and a breathalyzer test), with id. 
at 2187–96 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing it 
is unreasonable for the police to administer a warrantless blood-draw and a 
breathalyzer test).  Compare Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059–64 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., majority opinion) (holding that it is reasonable for an officer to stop 
a pedestrian without suspicion because the officer later discovered the pedestrian 
had unpaid parking tickets), with id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that it is unreasonable for an officer to stop a pedestrian without 
suspicion, regardless of later-discovered unpaid parking tickets).   
 204. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). 
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reasonable?205  Is using the data collected from cell-towers to track a suspect’s 
movements reasonable?206  These questions, obviously, do not have clear-cut 
answers—and they involve technology the framers could never have 
imagined, let alone expressed opinions on.   
When dealing with constitutional rights, it is usually easy to find the 
edges.  The First Amendment certainly protects the people’s right to 
peacefully criticize the government,207 but it does “not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”208  The trick is deciding where 
to draw the line in the in-between, gray-area cases.  Can the government, 
consistent with the First Amendment, limit the amount of money corporations 
and unions can spend on elections?209  Can the government prohibit elected 
judges from speaking on certain political issues during their campaigns to 
maintain the appearance of impartial courts?210  Can the courts prevent the 
press from reporting on high-profile criminal cases to ensure the defendant is 
afforded a fair trial?211  Answering these questions necessarily requires value 
judgments and policy analyses, not the “contrived and opaque veil of 
historical inquiry” that typically accompanies the originalist school of 
thought.212   
Similarly, First Amendment cases often turn on whether the government 
had a “compelling interest” that justified its restriction on speech,213 and sex-
based discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment often turn on 
whether the government had an “important interest” that justified its 
discrimination.214  Determining whether the government’s proffered interest 
is sufficiently “important” or “compelling” necessarily requires the judge to 
 
 205. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).  
 206. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 207. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (describing the 
ability to criticize the government as “the central meaning of the First 
Amendment”); see also Alexander J. Lindvall, Frankly, My Dear, I Don’t Give a 
*Darn*—An Argument Against Censoring Broadcast Media, 7 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 153, 157, 160–61 (2017) (noting that criticizing the government and 
informing the electorate are two of the core purposes underlying the First 
Amendment).   
 208. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 209. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010).  
 210. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).  
 211. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976).  
 212. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, 
Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a 
“Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (2012) (noting 
that originalism often requires judges to rely heavily on historical sources rather 
than pragmatic policy arguments).  
 213. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).  
 214. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Miss. Univ. 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982).  
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make a value judgment.  These issues cannot be answered simply by looking 
to the Constitution’s text or the framers’ beliefs.  
This game can be played with virtually any part of the Constitution.  If 
you threw a dart at the Constitution, chances are you would hit an ambiguous 
phrase that needs more context.  Article I, § 3 of the Constitution gives the 
Senate the “sole power to try all Impeachments.”215  But if the President was 
impeached, could the Senators get together and have a “coin toss” to decide 
whether the President should be removed from office?216  The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the government from inflicting “cruel and unusual 
punishments” on prisoners.217  Is tying a prisoner to a pole on a hot day cruel 
and unusual?218  Even the comically specific parts of the Constitution are open 
to interpretation.  The Seventh Amendment, for example, guarantees a jury 
trial in all civil cases where the amount at issue “exceed[s] twenty dollars.”219  
But should this twenty-dollar threshold be adjusted for inflation?220 
These are difficult questions, and the answers cannot be found in the text 
of the Constitution or historical sources.  To determine the best answer to truly 
difficult constitutional questions—like those asked above—a judge needs to 
utilize all the tools in his or her judicial toolbox.  When interpreting and 
applying fuzzy constitutional language, a judge should look to (i) the 
provision’s text, (ii) the history surrounding the provision, (iii) available 
judicial precedent, (iv) the provision’s purpose, (v) the consequences of a 
particular interpretation, and (vi) our American tradition as a whole.221  
Conservative judges, however, often use historical sources as their primary—
and sometimes only—guide.  There is a reason for this, as discussed below.   
 
 215. U.S. Const. art I, § 3, cl. 6.  
 216. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “[i]f the Senate were to act in a manner seriously 
threatening the integrity of its [impeachment] results, convicting, say, upon a coin 
toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was 
simply ‘a bad guy,’ judicial interference might well be appropriate.” (internal 
citations and quotations omitted)).  
 217. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  
 218. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736–37 (2002).  
 219. U.S. Const. amend. VII.  
 220. Note, The Twenty Dollar Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1672–73 
(2005).  
 221. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S 
VIEW 74 (2010) (arguing that a judge’s interpretational tools are text, history, 
tradition, precedent, purpose, and consequences); see also Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. 
Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that the courts should look to a 
provision’s “context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its 
effects and consequences; and its spirit and purpose” when interpreting 
ambiguous language).  
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B.  Conservative Judges Use History as a Smokescreen to Reach 
Their Desired Outcomes 
At its core, originalist theory maintains that “constitutional interpretation 
should be characterized exclusively by an effort to determine the 
Constitution’s meaning [through] some form of historical inquiry.”222  
Because of this, originalist judges often erect a “contrived and opaque veil of 
historical inquiry” when deciding cases, where they can pick and choose from 
a seemingly unlimited number of historical sources to support their 
position.223  This history-made-me-do-it method of deciding cases provides 
“an ideal smokescreen behind which judges [can] pursue their personal, 
moral, political, or economic goals with relative impunity.”224  Given the 
seemingly unlimited number of available historical sources, judges can easily 
reverse engineer an opinion to fit their desired outcome.   
To illustrate, in District of Columbia v. Heller,225 the Court’s 2008 
decision that held the Second Amendment bestows an individual right to own 
handguns for home protection, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens both relied 
heavily on historical sources in their respective opinions, yet reached opposite 
conclusions.226  A rough count shows that Justices Scalia and Stevens each 
cited about 200 sources authored before 1900 in their respective opinions—
including an 1807 book called “Portraiture of Quakerism,”227 a 1794 book 
titled “The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English 
Language,”228 and “An Act for the trial of Negroes.”229 
Heller shows that relying on history as an exclusive guide gives rise to 
an obvious problem: there is essentially an unlimited number of historical 
sources that can be used to justify a point.  If you want to conclude the Second 
Amendment gives individuals the right to own modern-day weapons, cite the 
200 or so historical sources in Justice Scalia’s opinion.  If you want to 
conclude the opposite, cite the 200 or so historical sources in Justice Stevens’s 
dissent.  Seemingly recognizing this problem, Justice Scalia was forced to 
chastise Justice Stevens in Heller for citing the “wrong” history:  
Justice Stevens relies on the drafting history of the Second 
Amendment—the various proposals in the state conventions and the 
debates in Congress. It is dubious to rely on such history to interpret a 
 
 222. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, 
Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a 
“Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (2012).  
 223. Id. at 1489.  
 224. Id. at 1522. 
 225. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 226. Compare id. at 573–636 (Scalia, J., majority opinion ), with id. at 636–80 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 227. Id. at 590 (majority opinion). 
 228. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 229. Id. at 581 (majority opinion).  
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text that was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather 
than to fashion a new one.230 
To Scalia, the Second Amendment’s “drafting history” is “dubious” 
history, while his sources—his personally selected newspaper articles, letters, 
and journals—represent the correct history.231   
To quote Scalia himself, this whole exercise is just a bunch of 
“interpretive jiggery-pokery.”232  If this is truly going to be the Court’s model 
for deciding cases, we should stop appointing lawyers and judges to the bench 
and start appointing historians and linguists (and perhaps psychic mediums).  
Lawyers tend to be forward-looking, not backward-looking.  They are good 
at solving novel, real-world problems, not poring through dusty historical 
sources.  If the true task is determining what James Madison and his cohorts 
thought of modern-day legal issues, most lawyers are ill-suited for this job. 
In contrast, in his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer noted that approximately 
seventy people are killed by guns each day, which translates to roughly 30,000 
gun-related deaths per year, and that an additional 200,000 people suffer from 
gun-related injuries each year.233  He also noted that (a) thousands of children 
die each year due to gun accidents, (b) handguns are involved in the vast 
majority of gun-related injuries and deaths, and (c) “[f]or every intruder 
stopped by a homeowner with a firearm, there are four gun-related accidents 
within the home.”234  These real-world statistics, Justice Breyer argued, 
should at least be considered when determining the extent to which the Second 
Amendment protects the right to own and carry present-day firearms.235   
Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education, perhaps the Court’s most 
lauded decision,236 the Court unanimously rejected the idea of originalism:  
In approaching th[e] problem [of racial segregation in schools], we 
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.  
We must consider public education in the light of its full development 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.  Only in 
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives 
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.237 
 
 230. Id. at 603. 
 231. Id. 
 232. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 694 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 234. Id. at 694–97. 
 235. Id. at 699–705.  
 236. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1412 (2020) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring in part) (describing Brown as “the single most important and 
greatest decision in th[e] Court’s history”).   
 237. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).  
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/7
2020] FEDERAL OFFICERS EVADE CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 1043 
Which of the following arguments is more persuasive?  (A): The public 
schools cannot be racially segregated because segregation gives black 
students a lifelong “feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community,” 
and studies consistently show that racial segregation negatively affects black 
children’s ability and willingness to learn.238  (B): The public schools can be 
racially segregated because the Congressmen who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 were pro-segregation.239  Any reader with a heart and a 
brain likely chose argument (A).  When interpreting and applying the 
Constitution, the framers’ opinions, of course, should be considered; but if 
following the framers would lead to patently unacceptable results, they should 
be cast aside.   
The Court’s decision in Brown and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller 
show that one cannot (or at least should not) engage in constitutional 
interpretation without considering the real-world consequences of a particular 
interpretation.  The Constitution was ratified expressly to “form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, [and] promote 
the general Welfare.”240  If a particular interpretation would clearly harm the 
country, decrease the people’s general welfare, or lead to unjust results, that 
interpretation must be incorrect, because it goes against the express purpose 
of the document itself.  
The “ultimate question” when dealing with squishy, open-ended 
constitutional questions should be: “[W]hat do the words of the text mean in 
our time?”241 “For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static 
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current 
 
 238. Id. at 494; id. at 494 n.11 (citing multiple studies on the psychological 
effects of racial segregation).  
 239. It is well-accepted that the Congress that adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment would have widely disagreed with Brown.  See, e.g., RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 132–46 (Liberty Fund 2nd ed. 1997) (concluding that 
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for the Amendment to 
prohibit school segregation); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 634 (Vintage 
Books 1st ed. 1977) (same); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding 
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10, 53–59 (1955) (same).  The 
Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, after all, also voted to 
segregate the D.C. school system.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
12 (6th ed. 2020).  In short, “[v]irtually nothing in the congressional debates 
suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit school 
segregation,” and “[t]o strike down public school segregation in Brown…the 
Justices consciously [chose] to burst asunder the shackles of original intent.”  
Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991). 
 240. U.S. CONST. Preamble.  
 241. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION 7 (Oct. 12, 1985) (lecture delivered at 
Georgetown Law’s “Text and Teaching Symposium”).   
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needs.”242  Constitutional interpretation, in other words, should always look 
to how the law actually affects people’s lives; and judges should not reach 
patently unfair results because they think the ghost of James Madison would 
have wanted it.   
Take the goal of “establish[ing] Justice,” for example.  In 1215, the 
Magna Carta declared that “justice” required both fair processes and fair 
results.243  Consistent with this theory, the Court has sought to establish justice 
by requiring both procedural and substantive due process.244  That is, the 
government must implement and follow fair procedures when depriving a 
person of life, liberty, or property,245 and it must also ensure that these 
processes do not produce patently unfair results.246   
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, for example, the Court held that individuals 
have a right of private sexual autonomy that is beyond the government’s 
reach.247  In 1935, Oklahoma passed the Habitual Crime Sterilization Act, 
which directed the government to sexually sterilize “habitual criminals” (i.e., 
criminals who committed two or more felonies involving “moral 
turpitude”).248  When sterilizing these criminals, men would be subject to a 
forced vasectomy, and women would be subject to a forced salpingectomy 
 
 242. Id.  See also Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the 
United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987) (“[T]he true miracle 
was not the birth of the Constitution, but its life.”).   
 243. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67 (2018).  
 244. Id.  As an aside, Abbasi and Hernández betray this promise on both 
counts—the plaintiffs in these cases were not afforded a fair process (they were 
not even allowed to bring their cases), and the results were clearly unfair (the 
Hernández majority even recognized the case was “tragic”).  Hernández v. Mesa, 
140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020).   
 245. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).  
 246. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (holding 
that the Due Process Clause protects unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition”); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 499 (1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevent the government 
from breaking up family dwellings without a compelling justification); Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits government conduct that “shocks the conscience”); Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
prevents the government from interfering with rights “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause protects “those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); see also Ryan C. 
William, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 
411 (2010) (noting that it is widely accepted that the Due Process Clause has a 
substantive component).   
 247. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
 248. Id. at 536–37.  
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(removal of the fallopian tubes).249  After Jack Skinner was convicted of 
“stealing chickens,” the state sought to sterilize him.250   
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down this law and 
prevented the state from performing involuntary, testicular surgery on 
Skinner.251  Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas observed that sexual 
autonomy is “one of the basic civil rights of man.”252  “Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to [our] very existence and survival,” he noted.253  
And “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may . . . [have] devastating effects” 
that could “cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to 
wither and disappear.”254  In other words, although the Constitution does not 
mention eugenics or government-forced sterilizations, this is not a power the 
government should have.   
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that the government 
cannot criminalize private sexual relations between consenting adults.255  In 
1998, Houston police arrested and criminally charged John Lawrence and 
Tyron Garner for having gay sex in a private apartment.256  As the Court made 
clear, neither party was coerced, there were no minors involved, and the act 
was being performed behind closed doors.257  The case involved “two adults 
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual 
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”258  In overturning Lawrence’s 
and Garner’s convictions, the Court made clear that “[t]heir right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government.”259 
These seem to be perfectly sensible rulings.  The Constitution, our 
nation’s “great outline,”260 does not allow the government to throw people in 
jail for harmless, private sexual conduct;261 and the government cannot force 
people to undergo invasive, life-altering surgeries without  justification.262  
The Court’s modern conservatives, however, have consistently rejected the 
doctrine of substantive due process—and have consequently advocated for a 
 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id. at 537.  
 251. Id. at 541.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).   
 256. Id. at 563.  
 257. Id. at 578.  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. 
 260. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).  
 261. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 262. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540–41 (1942). 
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government with greater power to interfere with basic civil rights.263  Justice 
Scalia, for example, would like to “vaporize” the Court’s substantive due 
process line of cases.264 
This makes no sense.  Constitutional interpretation should always look 
to how the law actually affects people’s lives.265  In resolving today’s 
problems, it makes no sense for conservative Justices to demand we resolve 
them in a way that our slave-owning, long-deceased forefathers would have 
agreed with.  The framers were not clairvoyant or omniscient; their prized 
document could not ward off a civil war and had to be amended twenty-seven 
times before it proved to be truly workable.  So, while the framers’ views—
to the extent they can actually be known—should of course be considered, 
they should never be dispositive.   
C.  Conservative Judges Often Choose to Reach Heartless and 
Unacceptable Results 
Most Americans know shockingly little about the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court.  A University of Pennsylvania study, for example, found that 
 
 263. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 695–71 (2015) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (comparing the Court’s modern substantive due process cases to 
the Dred Scott and Lochner decisions); id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “[substantive due process] stands for nothing whatever, except those 
freedoms and entitlements that [the] Court really likes”); id. at 721–22 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that substantive due process is an indefensible legal 
doctrine); id. at 722 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing substantive due 
process as “an imaginary constitutional protection” that requires a “revisionist 
view of our history and tradition”).  See also Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 
F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (per Easterbrook, J.) (calling substantive due 
process an “oxymoron”); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the 
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494–96 (1997) (arguing that substantive 
due process is textually unsupportable, and that the Court’s long line of 
substantive due process cases have weak precedential value). 
 264. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 909 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing Justice Scalia’s position on substantive due process) 
(“Justice Scalia does not seem troubled by the fact that his method [of deciding 
cases] is largely inconsistent with the Court’s canonical substantive due process 
decision… To the contrary, he seems to embrace this dissonance. My method 
seeks to synthesize dozens of cases on which the American people have relied for 
decades. Justice Scalia’s method seeks to vaporize them.”).  So, given Justice 
Thomas’s and Justice Scalia’s dismissive attitude toward fundamental rights and 
precedent, like Justice Stevens, “I am left to wonder, which of us is more faithful 
to this Nation’s constitutional history?  And which of us is more faithful to the 
values and commitments of the American people, as they stand today?”  Id.   
 265. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 
1996 ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1145 (1996) (summarizing Justice Marshall’s approach 
to legal interpretation as a “a practical, commonsense approach” that always 
looked to the “way in which the law [affected] people’s lives”).   
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seventy-four percent of those surveyed could not name all three branches of 
government, thirty-seven percent could not name any of the rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment, and fifty-three percent believe the Constitution 
affords no protections to undocumented immigrants.266  When asked about the 
courts during election season, Republican presidential candidates usually say 
something along the lines of, “If elected, I will appoint judges who will 
interpret the Constitution as written and as it was originally understood.”267  
Democratic candidates usually say, “I will appoint judges who respect a 
woman’s right to choose and who understand the corrosive effect money has 
on politics.”268  And that is usually the extent of the discussion.   
But outside the halls of American law schools, the actual substantive 
outcomes of Supreme Court cases are rarely discussed.269  And it is highly 
unlikely that voters are following up to see if judges are voting the way they 
would like.  This presents an interesting question: Do Republican-appointed 
judges reach results that benefit Republican voters or are these people voting 
against their self-interest?  This Article argues that if the Republican base 
actually examined the Republican-appointed Justices’ voting records, they 
would be largely disappointed.   
Conservative Justices often vote in ways that would disappoint 
conservative voters.  For example, Republican-appointed Justices have held 
that foreign corporations cannot be sued for bankrolling terrorist 
organizations.270  School staff members cannot be held liable for strip-
searching a thirteen-year-old middle school student to see if she was carrying 
ibuprofen.271  A man can be sentenced to life in prison for stealing $150 worth 
 
 266. Michael Rozansky, Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic 







 267. These words, I believe, are meaningless.  The founders disagreed 
amongst themselves on almost every issue, and your average voter has absolutely 
no idea what James Madison—or any other founder—would think on a given 
topic.  The candidate’s words are meant to be hollow, allowing the (likely 
uninformed) voter to fill them with whatever meaning they wish.  To some, these 
words mean “I’ll appoint a Justice who’s against abortion.”  To others, it means 
“I’ll appoint a Justice who’s pro-gun.”  And so on.   
 268. As if these are the only two issues the courts decide.  
 269. There are, of course, obvious, high-profile exceptions. See, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);  
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 270. Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (2018) (per Kennedy, J.).   
 271. Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 383–403 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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of videotapes for his children.272  The government can ban ethnic groups from 
entering the country, explicitly because of their religion and national origin.273  
A prosecutor’s office cannot be held responsible for withholding exonerating 
evidence in a criminal trial, thereby knowingly placing an innocent man in jail 
for fourteen years.274  Police departments cannot be sued for instituting an 
illegal and dangerous “chokehold policy” during routine traffic stops,275 even 
though the policy caused one detainee to spit up blood and urinate and 
defecate on himself.276  Unions are free to spend unlimited amounts of money 
to influence the outcomes of elections.277  Congress cannot pass laws to 
prevent the southern states from enacting laws that suppress the black vote.278  
Federal court rules do not allow plaintiffs to bring claims of government-
endorsed torture and unlawful detention if the trial judge finds their 
allegations “implausible.”279  Government officials cannot be sued for 
unlawfully detaining and physically abusing prisoners because of their 
religion.280  The government can track people using their cellphones without 
a warrant or probable cause.281  Congress cannot afford women the right to 
sue their rapists in federal court.282  Businesses can prevent their employees 
from collectively suing for systemic wage underpayment.283  Federal officials 
can hold illegal aliens indefinitely, without bail or a hearing.284  State 
legislatures can redraw congressional districts exclusively to gain a partisan 
advantage, thereby entrenching incumbents in positions of power.285  Judges 
can never be sued for their judicial actions, even if the judge knowingly 
violated the Constitution by ordering a girl to be secretly sterilized during her 
 
 272. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76–77 (2003) (per O’Connor, J.).  
 273. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018) (per Roberts, C.J.).  
 274. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (per Thomas, J.).  
 275. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110–13 (1983) (majority 
opinion of White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, J.J.).  
 276. Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“When [the detainee] regained 
consciousness, he was lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, 
and spitting up blood and dirt.  He had urinated and defecated.  He was [then] 
issued a traffic citation and released.”). 
 277. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310. 339–40 (2010) (per Kennedy, J.).  
 278. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (per Roberts, 
C.J.).  
 279. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682–83 (2009) (per Kennedy, J.).  
 280. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868–69 (2017) (per Kennedy, J.).  
 281. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223‒72 (2018) (Kennedy, 
Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 282. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (per Rehnquist, 
C.J.).   
 283. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (per Gorsuch, 
J.).   
 284. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847–48 (2018) (per Alito, J.).  
 285. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (per Roberts, 
C.J.).  
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appendectomy.286  It is not “unreasonable” for the police to arrest someone 
and tow their car for committing a minor civil traffic violation for which jail 
time was not a punishment.287  Factually innocent prisoners can be put to death 
so long as their trial was proper.288  
Once one buys into the premise that all judges—liberal and conservative 
alike—choose the outcomes of truly difficult constitutional cases, these 
results seem completely unacceptable.  Almost all the above-mentioned cases 
were five-to-four decisions; and in many of these cases, the Supreme Court 
overruled a lower court to reach these results.289  It is not as if these five 
Justices are reaching the only sensible conclusion.  In fact, when the lower 
court decisions are taken into account, the Court’s five conservatives are often 
in the minority.290  These Justices are not “interpreting the Constitution as 
written.”  (As previously shown, that platitude is meaningless.291)  Rather, 
these Justices are interpreting the Constitution the way they want it to be 
interpreted.  Originalism is a lie.  The sooner we all accept this, the sooner we 
can begin to discuss difficult cases in meaningful, real-world terms, rather 
than trying to discern the opinions of ghosts.  
IV.  THE LARGER PICTURE: IMMUNIZING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
The majority opinions in Abbasi and Hernández show the Roberts Court 
is more than willing to shield federal officials from civil rights suits.292  But 
these decisions are just two pieces in a much larger puzzle.  When the Court’s 
 
 286. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351‒53, 364 (1978) (per White, J.).   
 287. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (per Souter, J.).  
 288. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427–28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 289. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (reversing two 3-0 lower court 
decisions: Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D. N.C. 2018), and 
Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018)); Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (reversing a 3-0 lower court decision, Lewis 
v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), and a 2-1 lower court 
decision, Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016)); City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 99–100 (1983) (reversing the 3-0 decision of 
the lower court: Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1981)); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (reversing the 3-0 decision of the 
lower court: Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 290. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (taking the lower court decisions into 
account, the Court’s conservatives were in a 10-to-5 minority); Epic Systems, 138 
S. Ct. at 1632 (taking the Circuit Court decisions into account, the Court’s 
conservatives were in a 9-to-6 minority); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 99–100 (taking the 
Circuit Court decision into account, the Court’s conservatives were in a 7-to-5 
minority); Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 364 (taking the Circuit Court decision into 
account, the Court’s conservatives were in a 7-to-5 minority).   
 291. See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 292. See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020); Zigler v. Abbasi, 137 
S. Ct. 1843, 1860, 1862–63 (2017). 
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decisions over the last fifty years or so are viewed holistically, the overall 
pattern is clear: “the Court’s conservative majority almost always finds a way 
to rule against civil rights plaintiffs and this is usually done by closing the 
courthouse doors to litigants.”293  The Court has weaponized the doctrines of 
justiciability, governmental immunity, and Bivens limitations to ensure 
government officials will not be held civilly accountable; and through its 
narrow reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has 
“mounted impressive barriers to bringing civil cases at all.”294  This Part 
illustrates this point and argues that these court-made restrictions are neither 
wise nor legally required.   
A.  Justiciability 
The Supreme Court’s most important role is to interpret and enforce the 
Constitution and federal laws.295  The Court’s self-made justiciability 
doctrines, however, have made certain provisions of the Constitution 
unenforceable and have made many constitutional violations unredessable.296  
Most significantly, the Supreme Court has created and used “standing” 
requirements and the “political question doctrine” to avoid answering 
important constitutional questions.297   
1.  The Court’s Standing Rules Are Unjustifiable 
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution lists nine categories of lawsuits the 
federal courts can hear.298  Article III repeatedly uses the terms “cases” and 
“controversies” when describing the types of suits within the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction.299  The Supreme Court has interpreted the terms “cases” and 
 
 293. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights 
Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 540 (2003).  
 294. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to 
Redress, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167, 2177 (2018).   
 295. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1459, 1493 (2017); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 227, 282 (1990).  
 296. Chemerinsky, supra note 295 at 1477–80 .  
 297. See, e.g., id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 293 at 539 (arguing that the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts created and expanded the doctrines of abstention 
and justiciability to ensure civil rights plaintiffs lose). 
 298. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 cl. 1.  
 299. Id. (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the United States shall be a 
party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between a state and 
citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens 
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“controversies” to mean that the federal courts are accessible only to plaintiffs 
who have suffered a “distinct and palpable injury”300 that is not too “general” 
in nature.301  If a plaintiff’s injury is not sufficiently “concrete” and 
“particularized,” the federal courts cannot decide the case.302   
This concrete-and-individualized-injury requirement is typically 
referred to as the Court’s “standing” requirement.303  Phrased in legal 
elements, to avoid dismissal of their case, plaintiffs must show (1) they have 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury, (2) this injury was caused by the 
defendant, and (3) the court has the ability to sufficiently redress this injury.304  
These requirements, on their face, seem reasonable enough; but the caselaw 
makes it clear that this doctrine is primarily (a) an escape hatch the courts can 
use to avoid deciding difficult cases and (b) a tool that judges can use to 
dismiss cases that do not align with their ideologies.305   
“For many, achieving Article III standing is an insurmountable task.”306  
Although the Supreme Court has provided a consistently cited test for 
standing,307 it seems to manipulate the rules based on its views of the merits 
of particular cases.308  As Professor Richard Pierce has observed, the Justices’ 
votes on standing are “as easy to predict as the votes of their ideological 
counterparts in the legislature.”309  While the liberal Justices tend to find that 
environmental groups, employees, and prisoners have standing, their 
conservative counterparts do not.310  And the conservative Justices tend to find 
that corporations and banks have standing, while their liberal counterparts do 
not.311  These Justices all the while claim they are simply applying an 
 
of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a 
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” (emphasis 
added)).   
 300. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 
72 (1978).  
 301. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992). 
 302. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1543, 1548 (2016) (holding that a 
plaintiff’s injury must be both “concrete” and “particularized” to have standing).  
 303. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 304. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citing 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)).  
 305. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 
1743 (1999) (showing that Justices grant and deny standing consistent with their 
perceived ideologies).  
 306. Alexander J. Lindvall, Ending Dark Money in Arizona, 44 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 61, 81 (2019).  
 307. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–76 (explaining that to have standing, a 
plaintiff must have (1) suffered a concrete and particularized injury that was (2) 
caused by the defendant’s conduct and that can (3) be redressed by the court).  
 308. See generally Pierce, Jr., supra note 305.  
 309. Pierce, Jr., supra note 305, at 1743.   
 310. Pierce, Jr., supra note 305, at 1743  
 311. Pierce, Jr., supra note 305, at 1743  
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objective, nonpartisan, and constitutionally-required legal doctrine.312  This is 
a lie.   
The standing doctrine is unjustifiable.  Although the courts and scholars 
have provided several justifications for this doctrine,313 none can withstand 
even minimal scrutiny.  First and foremost, proponents of the standing 
doctrine argue it is mandated by Article III’s “case” and “controversy” 
language.314  Because the courts can only hear “cases” and “controversies,” 
the argument goes, the defendant must have caused the plaintiff some sort of 
concrete injury to ensure there is an actual controversy.  This is nonsense.  
Although Article III limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to nine categories 
of lawsuits, it says nothing of injuries-in-fact, causation, or redressability.  
These are judicially contrived devices that need to be justified beyond the 
language of the Constitution.   
Take Allen v. Wright, for example, where the Court dismissed a nation-
wide, class-action lawsuit that challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s 
(“IRS”) illegal policy of giving tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
private schools.315  Although federal law prevents the IRS from giving tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools,316 during the 1970s 
and 80s, the IRS refused to abide by this law and awarded tax-exempt status 
to many whites-only private schools.317  A group of black parents from across 
the country sued.318  By giving these racially discriminatory schools huge tax 
breaks, the parents argued, the IRS was unlawfully fostering the expansion of 
these private “white” schools, making desegregation in public schools much 
more difficult.319   
Despite acknowledging that the parents’ claim was “beyond any doubt 
. . . one of the most serious injuries recognized by our legal system,”320 the 
Court dismissed the parents’ case because the five-Justice majority did not 
believe there was a sufficient link between the IRS’s unlawful conduct and 
 
 312. Pierce, Jr., supra note 305, at 1743  
 313. See, e.g., Shane Palmer, No Legs to Stand On: Article III Injury and 
Official Proponents of State Voter Initiatives, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1056, 1059 
(2015) (citing multiple sources to show the primary purposes underlying the 
Court’s standing doctrine).  
 314. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding 
that the Court’s standing doctrine is constitutionally required under Article III); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (“In its constitutional dimension, 
standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or 
controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art[icle] 
III. This is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of 
the court to entertain the suit.”).  
 315. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752–53 (1984).  
 316. Id. at 740.   
 317. Id. at 744–45.  
 318. Id. at 739. 
 319. Id. at 752–53.  
 320. Id. at 756.  
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/7
2020] FEDERAL OFFICERS EVADE CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 1053 
the “white flight” happening around the country.321  These Justices, in other 
words, did not believe “there were enough racially discriminatory private 
schools receiving tax exemptions in [the parents’] communities . . . to make 
an appreciable difference in public school integration.”322  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the Constitution did not allow the federal courts to hear the 
parents’ suit.323  
Similarly, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court held that the victim of a 
police chokehold did not have standing to challenge the police department’s 
“chokehold policy” because there was no evidence that there was a “real and 
immediate threat of future injury [to] the [victim].”324  Although the police, 
pursuant to department policy, placed the victim in a carotid chokehold during 
a routine traffic stop, causing him to spit up blood and urinate and defecate on 
himself,325 the Court found the victim’s lawsuit was not allowed because a 
favorable court ruling could not erase the fact that he had already been 
choked.326   
If the standing doctrine comes from Article III, as the Court claims, that 
means the lawsuits seen in Allen and Lyons were not “cases.”327  This is 
ridiculous.  Any reasonable person would believe these plaintiffs had 
legitimate lawsuits that could only be described as “cases.”  But instead of 
addressing Article III’s text, the Allen and Lyons majorities went down a 
meandering path of determining whether the plaintiffs suffered a sufficient 
injury, whether their injuries were sufficiently linked to the government, and 
whether the Court could sufficiently redress the injuries by stopping the 
government’s unlawful behavior.328  Where are these requirements in Article 
III?  I cannot find them.  These standing elements are judicially created 
rules—divorced from the text of the Constitution—that the Court uses to 
 
 321. Id. at 757.  
 322. Id. at 758.  
 323. Id. at 766. 
 324. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983).  
 325. Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“When [the detainee] regained 
consciousness, he was lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, 
and spitting up blood and dirt.  He had urinated and defecated.  He was [then] 
issued a traffic citation and released.”). 
 326. See id. at 111 (holding that a plaintiff could not challenge a police 
department’s chokehold policy, even though he had been horrifically choked by 
police, because he could not show that he would be choked again).  
 327. Compare Allen, 468 U.S. at 750–51 (holding that the standing doctrine is 
required by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 
1 (providing that “[t]he judicial power…extend[s] to all cases…arising under this 
Constitution [and] the laws of the United States…” (emphasis added)).  
 328. This seems to be a common judicial tactic in this area of law: the Court 
makes so many legal inferences, and makes its opinion so meandering, that it is 
easy for the reader to lose sight of the big picture.  
41
Lindvall: Gutting Bivens: How the Supreme Court Shielded Federal Officials
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1054 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
dodge difficult questions.329  If standing is going to be justified, it needs to 
rely on more than empty words like “cases” and “controversies.”  
Second, proponents argue that the standing doctrine is appropriate 
because it helps lighten the courts’ dockets.330  This is at least partially true—
any doctrine that allows the courts to dismiss cases is going to lighten dockets.  
But this makes a very questionable value judgment that places efficiency over 
the need for federal courts to interpret and enforce the Constitution.  If you 
accept the assumption that the courts’ primary purpose is to enforce and 
interpret the Constitution, then the argument that “judges are too busy to 
decide difficult constitutional issues” is nonsensical.  What could judges be 
doing that is more important than deciding constitutional issues?  That is the 
primary purpose for their existence.   
Just look at Allen and Lyons.  The Allen Court conceded that the 
plaintiffs’ injury (racial segregation) was “one of the most serious injuries 
recognized by our legal system,”331 yet the Court refused to rule on the 
issue.332  And though the Lyons Court recognized that the government’s 
challenged policy had killed at least fifteen people,333 it still dismissed the 
plaintiff’s case and refused to halt this deadly and likely unconstitutional 
policy.334  Are we really supposed to believe that these are the cases that 
needed to be dismissed to lighten the dockets?  The Court’s docket was too 
heavy to determine whether the IRS could subsidize whites-only schools?  
The Court was too swamped to decide whether the police could continue to 
follow a policy that was killing people?  This argument rings especially 
hollow when it comes from the Supreme Court, which currently hears only 
seventy to eighty cases per year.335  Divide that caseload by the nine Justices 
and each of their four law clerks, and this argument borders on offensive. 
Third, proponents argue the standing doctrine ensures the parties will be 
invested in their case because they have a personal stake in the outcome, 
 
 329. See Shane Palmer, No Legs to Stand On: Article III Injury and Official 
Proponents of State Voter Initiatives, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1056, 1061 (2015) 
(arguing that “the ideas behind [the] standing doctrine have [historically] been 
deployed as a means of avoiding deeply contentious constitutional questions”).  
 330. Id. at 1065 (citing Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to 
“Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 
45 GA. L. REV. 1, 19–22 (2010)).  
 331. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756. 
 332. Id. at 765–66. 
 333. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 100 (1983).  
 334. Id. at 113. 
 335. Kenneth W. Moffett et al., The Supreme Court is Taking Far Fewer Cases 
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thereby “sharpen[ing] the presentation of [the] issues.”336  In other words, the 
standing doctrine allows plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit only if they are likely to 
be fully invested in the suit, which means they will likely write better briefs 
and take the case seriously, which will help the courts decide the tough issues.  
This is probably the most persuasive argument in favor of standing.  Judges 
rely heavily on the litigants and their attorneys to flesh out complicated legal 
questions, and requiring competent and adverse parties makes a lot of sense.   
But the Court often ignores this rationale.  The Court routinely dismisses 
cases where the parties are fully invested in the suit and there is no reason to 
believe their briefs would be inadequate.337  In Clapper v. Amnesty 
International, for example, several attorneys, journalists, and human rights 
organizations challenged a federal statute that allows the federal government 
to spy on foreign citizens, arguing that the provision violates the First and 
Fourth Amendments.338  These plaintiffs alleged they regularly needed to 
communicate with individuals in foreign countries but were inhibited from 
doing so because they could not ensure their communications were 
confidential.339  The plaintiffs (some of whom were attorneys themselves) 
were represented by nine attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the large New York law firm Proskauer Rose, LLP.340  The defendants, 
as government officials, were represented by eleven attorneys from the 
Solicitor General’s Office and the Director of National Intelligence’s 
Office.341   
It was clear that the parties were fully invested in this lawsuit (they 
appealed it to the Supreme Court, after all).  The Court nonetheless dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ case for lack of standing.342  Because the plaintiffs could not 
show (a) that the government had actually spied on them or their clients or (b) 
that the government planned to spy on them in the immediate future, the Court 
found the plaintiffs could not show the sort of “actual or imminent” injury 
necessary to confer standing.343  Clapper clearly cannot be squared with the 
“we need the parties to be fully invested in the case” rationale.  Both parties 
and their attorneys vigorously litigated the case and were more than competent 
 
 336. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (“[A] personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy…assure[s] that concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination 
of difficult constitutional questions.”).  
 337. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2013).   
 338. Id. at 406–07. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 400. 
 341. Id.  
 342. Id. at 418, 422.  
 343. Id. at 410–14.  But of course, the plaintiffs didn’t have concrete evidence 
the government was spying on them—it’s classified.  Did the Court really think 
the government is going to say, “Yeah, we’ve been monitoring your emails and 
phone calls—here’s some exhibits for your complaint”?  This is such a 
disingenuous argument.   
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to brief and argue the issues presented.344  There was no reason to believe the 
parties were not fully invested or that the issues were not sufficiently 
illuminated.345  The Court simply wanted to avoid a thorny constitutional 
issue, and it achieved its desired result (i.e., dismissal) by again relying on this 
flimsy justiciability rationale.346   
Clapper shows that the Court’s standing doctrine does not further its 
underlying objectives.  If the Court’s true goal is to ensure that the issues are 
fleshed-out and that the parties are truly invested, it should look to the parties’ 
arguments, attorneys, and resources, not to the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.  
The Arizona courts, for example, which are not bound by Article III,347 waive 
the typical standing requirements when (i) the parties are clearly adversarial 
and (ii) the issues presented are “of great public importance.”348  These courts 
recognize that, in many instances, the party who was “injured” may have 
fewer resources or poorer arguments than other potential plaintiffs.  If the 
issue to be litigated concerns the government’s environmental regulations, for 
example, the Sierra Club would be a great litigant to have on one side of the 
issue.349  But the Sierra Club is rarely “injured” (at least as the Court has 
defined it) by the government’s environmental policies, and therefore often 
lacks standing to sue.350  This doctrine is meant to be an escape hatch for the 
courts, rather than a well-reasoned limit on their jurisdiction.  
Finally, proponents argue the standing doctrine promotes a healthy 
separation of powers and avoids confrontation with the political branches.351  
The Court has even gone so far as to say that “[n]o principle is more 
fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than 
the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
 
 344. Id. at 400. 
 345. Id. at 406–07. 
 346. Id. at 422. 
 347. Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, 309 
P.3d 1289, 1292 (Ariz. 2013) (recognizing that the Arizona courts are not bound 
by the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III, § 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution).   
 348. Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998) (recognizing that the 
Arizona courts have waived the traditional standing requirements when a case (i) 
presents “issues of great public importance” and (ii) the parties to that case are 
“true adversaries” (internal citations omitted)).   
 349. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972) (noting that the 
Sierra Club is “a membership corporation with a special interest in the 
conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges, and 
forests of the country” (internal quotations omitted)).   
 350. See id. at 741. 
 351. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 
460–63 (2008) (detailing the Court’s separation-of-powers argument when it 
comes to standing).  
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controversies.”352  Again, this argument suffers from a fatal flaw: as applied, 
this inflexible doctrine prevents the courts from deciding important 
constitutional issues, and thus prevents them from fulfilling their most 
important role.  This separation-of-powers argument makes a faulty 
assumption about the proper role of the judiciary.  It assumes the courts’ 
proper role is almost exclusively to remedy specific injuries to individual 
plaintiffs.  However, if you assume the judiciary’s primary purpose is to 
enforce the Constitution and keep the other branches in check, this separation-
of-powers argument loses much of its force.  
The standing doctrine is a sham.  The doctrine is (i) an escape hatch the 
courts can use to avoid deciding difficult cases and (ii) a tool the courts can 
use to dismiss cases that do not align with their political preferences.  This 
doctrine should be discarded—and judges should be honest about why they 
dismiss cases, rather than camouflaging their rulings with convoluted, 
disingenuous, the-Constitution-made-me-do-it language. 
2.  The Political Question Doctrine Is Indefensible   
The Court has held that certain constitutional issues amount to 
“nonjusticiable political questions” that cannot be ruled on by the federal 
courts.353  Under this doctrine, the courts will refuse to hear three kinds of 
issues: (1) issues the Constitution explicitly assigns to Congress or the 
Executive; (2) issues that require judges to move beyond the areas of judicial 
expertise; and (3) issues that require dismissal for some other prudential 
reason.354  Professor Alexander Bickel argues that this doctrine arose from a 
sense of judicial anxiety—anxiety that the issue in a case may be too strange, 
complex, or momentous for the court, and anxiety that the political branches 
or the people might ignore the Court’s ruling.355   
 
 352. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)) (internal quotes omitted).  
 353. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (holding the 
federal courts cannot resolve issues of political gerrymandering); Nixon v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (holding the federal courts cannot address issues 
related to impeachment trials).  Many cases involve issues that touch on hot-
button political topics—but that does not necessarily mean the cases involve a 
“political question.”  A nonjusticiable political question typically arises when 
either (1) there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of the 
issue to a coordinate branch of government or (2) there is “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving the issue.  Id. at 228.  
 354. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
 355. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 
49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 39 (2017) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (2d ed. 
1986)).  
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The Court’s most recent use of the political question doctrine came in 
the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause, where the Court held that the 
federal courts cannot resolve disputes over partisan gerrymandering.356  
Despite acknowledging that partisan gerrymandering was a very serious 
problem that undermined democracy itself,357 the Rucho Court held that the 
federal courts could not address this problem because there was not a 
“discernible and manageable standard” for deciding when a gerrymander is 
so partisan as to be unconstitutional.358  Because the Court’s five-Justice 
majority was not satisfied with any standard that had been put forward, it 
completely removed the issue from the federal courts’ purview.359 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion, however, completely puts the 
majority’s arguments to bed.  Not only are there judicially manageable 
standards for resolving issues of excessive partisan gerrymandering, she 
reasoned, but the Court had been handed one on a silver platter:   
But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its 
nose: What it says can’t be done has been done.  Over the past several 
years, federal courts across the country—including, but not 
exclusively, in the decisions below—have largely converged on a 
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims (striking 
down both Democratic and Republican districting plans in the 
process).  And that standard does what the majority says is impossible. 
… [B]y requiring plaintiffs to make difficult showings relating to both 
purpose and effects, the standard invalidates the most extreme, but 
only the most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.360 
Although the Court emphatically declared that there was no judicially 
manageable standard to evaluate partisan gerrymandering, it conveniently 
neglected to mention that every lower court to confront the issue has 
developed a workable standard and that the courts had largely converged on a 
well-accepted test to address the issue.361  In my opinion, no reasonable person 
could conclude the Court reached the right result in Rucho after reading 
Justice Kagan’s dissent.   
Rucho might be the clearest example of the Court using a “flimsy and 
untenable justification” to avoid a difficult, yet extremely important, 
constitutional issue.362  As Justice Kagan put it:  
 
 356. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07.  
 357. Id. at 2506 (noting that partisan gerrymandering can lead to “unjust” 
results that are “incompatible with democratic principles”).   
 358. Id. at 2501.  
 359. Id. at 2484–87. 
 360. Id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 361. Id.  
 362. Lynn Adelman, The Roberts Court’s Assault on Democracy, 43 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 147 (2019).  
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[T]he only way to understand the majority’s opinion is as follows: In 
the face of grievous harm to democratic governance and flagrant 
infringements on individuals’ rights—in the face of escalating partisan 
manipulation whose compatibility with this Nation’s values and law 
no one defends—the majority declines to provide any remedy.  For the 
first time in this Nation’s history, the majority declares that it can do 
nothing about an acknowledged constitutional violation . . . .363   
Scholars have also widely panned the political question doctrine.  
Professor Harlan Cohen, for example, argues that the doctrine, as applied, 
inappropriately shields the government from proper scrutiny.364  The political 
question doctrine is currently nothing short of a “trump card that ends debate” 
on a given issue.365  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, similarly, argues that the 
doctrine is “inconsistent with the federal courts’ primary mission of enforcing 
the Constitution.”366  “No allegation of constitutional violation should exist 
that federal courts cannot adjudicate,” Chemerinsky argues.367  By labeling 
some constitutional provisions as “nonjusticiable,” the Court is giving the 
political branches the green light to violate those provisions with impunity.   
Professor Martin Redish has even gone so far as to argue that “the 
political question doctrine should play no role whatsoever in the exercise of 
the judicial review power.”368  The federal courts have a “virtually unflagging 
obligation to exercise their jurisdiction,”369 and the political question doctrine 
is nothing but a cowardly shirking of this obligation.  The Constitution is 
meant to confer actual, enforceable rights, not to maintain abstract legal 
theories.  The political question doctrine has no place in American legal 
theory.   
B.  Governmental Immunity 
“A primary function of the federal courts is to provide relief against 
governments and government officers for their violations of the Constitution 
and laws of the United States.”370  The Supreme Court, however, requires 
plaintiffs to meet an “exacting” qualified immunity standard before executive 
officials—namely police officers—can be held liable for their 
 
 363. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 364. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 
49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 60 (2017).  
 365. Id.  
 366. Chemerinsky, supra note 295 at 1480. 
 367. Chemerinsky, supra note 295 at 1480. 
 368. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1985). 
 369. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (quoting Colo. River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).   
 370. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.1 at 497–98 (6th ed. 
2012).   
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unconstitutional behavior.371  Although federal law specifies that state actors 
“shall be liable” for their unconstitutional acts,372 the Supreme Court has held 
that plaintiffs must also show that the constitutional right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the violation, such that any reasonable officer 
would have understood he was violating it.373  In other words, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant officer was “plainly incompetent” by violating 
a constitutional right that “existing precedent [had] placed . . . beyond 
debate.”374   
This doctrine has morphed into impenetrable armor, where officers are 
overwhelmingly protected and plaintiffs are routinely left out to dry.375  As 
Justice Sotomayor recently observed: “Nearly all of the Supreme Court’s 
qualified immunity cases come out the same way—by finding immunity for 
the officials.”376  The Court’s current “one-sided approach” to qualified 
immunity, she continued, has “transform[ed] the doctrine into an absolute 
shield for law enforcement officers.”377  It  tells officers “they can shoot first 
and think later,” and it tells the public that “palpably unreasonable conduct 
will go unpunished.”378  According to one lower court judge, qualified 
immunity has become a “[h]eads the government wins, tails the plaintiff 
loses” doctrine.379 
Commentators have widely panned the Court’s qualified immunity 
doctrine.  Professor William Baude, for example, argues qualified 
immunity—at least as it’s currently implemented—has no basis in law and is 
a generally unpersuasive doctrine.380  Professors Joanna Schwartz and John 
Jeffries, moreover, argue that qualified immunity completely fails to fulfill its 
 
 371. City and Cty. of S.F., Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015).  
 372. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of [state 
law]…subjects…any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…” (emphasis 
added)).  
 373. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774. 
 374. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).  
 375. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (pointing out that the Court’s “one-sided approach” to qualified 
immunity has “transform[ed] the doctrine into an absolute shield for law 
enforcement officers”).  
 376. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV..45, 
82 (2018); see also Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162.  
 377. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 378. Id. 
 379. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 380. Baude, supra note 376, at 88 (claiming the doctrine “lacks legal 
justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive”).   
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underlying policy objectives,381 and that the Court should fundamentally 
reconfigure the doctrine to “get constitutional tort law back on track.”382  
Echoing these sentiments, Justice Thomas has expressly called for the Court 
to revisit and revise the doctrine, arguing that it is inconsistent with federal 
law and the role of the courts.383   
Commentators also persuasively argue that the Court’s current qualified 
immunity formulation has led to “constitutional stagnation.”384  As mentioned 
above, a qualified-immunity defense presents two issues: (1) whether the 
facts, as alleged by the plaintiff, show the violation of a constitutional right; 
and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the 
violation.385  In Saucier v. Katz, the Court required the lower courts to confront 
the first prong of this analysis before moving on to the second prong (i.e., the 
courts must first decide whether a constitutional violation occurred and, if a 
violation did occur, then decide whether the right was clearly established at 
the time).386  In Pearson v. Callaghan, however, the Court overruled this 
portion of Saucier, holding that this two-step approach “should not be 
regarded as mandatory in all cases.”387   
Because Pearson allows the lower courts to “punt” on the issue of 
whether the Constitution was violated—and instead just decide that the law 
was not “clearly established” at the time—important constitutional questions 
 
 381. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 70 
(2017) (concluding that “the Court’s efforts to advance its policy goals through 
qualified immunity doctrine has been an exercise in futility”).  
 382. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 851, 869 (2010) (“Today, the law of qualified immunity is out of balance. 
… The Supreme Court needs to intervene, not only to reconcile the divergent 
approaches of the Circuits but also, and more fundamentally, to rethink qualified 
immunity and get constitutional tort law back on track.”). 
 383. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine should be 
revisited and likely revised, as the doctrine “represent[s] precisely the sort of 
freewheeling policy choices that [the Court has] previously disclaimed the power 
to make”). 
 384. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part); see also Aaron L. Neilson & Christopher J. 
Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2015) (finding 
that the lower courts are increasingly unwilling to address constitutional questions 
in § 1983 cases because of the Court’s current qualified immunity doctrine).  
 385. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).  
 386. Id.   
 387. Pearson v. Callaghan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  The Pearson Court went 
on to say: “Our decision does not prevent the lower courts from following the 
[two-step] Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that those courts should have 
the discretion to decide whether that procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.”  
Id. at 242.  
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often go unanswered.388  This has led to a vicious cycle in which plaintiffs 
cannot point to factually analogous precedent because the courts are not 
producing precedent.389  “Courts then rely on that judicial silence to conclude 
there’s no equivalent case on the books.”390  “No precedent = no clearly 
established law = no liability.”391   
Qualified immunity is yet another doctrine that prevents the courts from 
fulfilling its “gravest and most delicate” responsibility: enforcing the 
Constitution.392  “This current ‘yes harm, no foul’ imbalance leaves victims 
violated but not vindicated.”393  “Wrongs are not righted, and wrongdoers are 
not reproached.”394  The Court’s qualified immunity doctrine should be 
discarded, and government officials should be held responsible for their 
unconstitutional behavior, even if the Court’s conservative majority would 
like to see otherwise.   
V.  COUNTERARGUMENTS CONSIDERED 
A.  Counterargument: Shouldn’t Congress, Not the Judiciary, Be the 
One to Authorize Suits Against Federal Officials? 
Response: Ideally, yes, but in the absence of congressional action, the 
courts should not sit idly by while federal officials violate constitutional 
rights.  When presented with a constitutional case or controversy, the courts 
have a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their jurisdiction”395 to 
ensure the Constitution is properly and meaningfully enforced.396  When a 
federal official is sued for violating a constitutional right, the courts often face 
a familiar choice: Does the Constitution allow the plaintiff to recover damages 
 
 388. Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479 (Willett, J., concurring and dissenting in part).   
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., 
concurring).  See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“When elected leaders cower before public pressure, this Court, more 
than ever, must not shirk its duty to enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the 
poor and powerless.”).  
 393. Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479 (Willett, J., concurring and dissenting in part).   
 394. Id.  
 395. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (quoting Colo. River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).   
 396. See Chemerinsky, supra note 295 at 1493 (arguing that the courts’ most 
important role is to enforce the Constitution).  
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or nothing?397  As the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution, this issue is for the 
courts, not Congress, to decide.398 
The Constitution is not enforced at the pleasure of Congress.  If Congress 
passed a statute that specifically allowed for suits against federal officials, that 
would be great.399  That would be an encouraging example of the branches 
working together to ensure the Constitution guarantees more than just “paper 
rights.”400  But Congress’s refusal to pass such a statute does not give the 
courts a hall pass when it comes to performing their judicial duties.  “We 
would like to enforce the Bill of Rights, but Congress has not given us 
permission yet” is not a coherent thought in a country where the “judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”401   
The Abbasi and Hernández Courts did get one thing right: at the end of 
the day, the core issue is “who should decide?”402  Who should decide how 
the Constitution is enforced?  Who should decide the proper meaning of the 
Bill of Rights?  And who should decide whether plaintiffs get damages, or 
whether they get nothing?  As mentioned in this article’s Introduction, James 
Madison envisioned the courts as “guardians” of the Bill of Rights—
“impenetrable bulwark[s] against every assumption of power in the 
 
 397. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 398. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–40, 444 (2000) 
(constitutionalizing the Miranda rule, which had long been described as 
“prophylactic” and “extraconstitutional”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
524 (1997) (“The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-
executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary 
authority to interpret those prohibitions. … The power to interpret the 
Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”); Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[A] permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system” is that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”).  
 399. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 1984 is marked as “omitted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1984 
(repealed June 25, 1948). There is no statute sitting in this section.  Id. Congress 
should place a Bivens-like statute in this section, in my opinion.   
 400. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Ashbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 
514 (1942) (“The Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial 
rights, not to maintain theories. Particularly in a case like this are we in the realm 
of actualities and not of abstractions and paper rights…” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  
 401. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  
 402. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1857).   
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Legislative or Executive.”403  To Madison, the answer was clear: the courts 
should decide.404   
B.  Counterargument: Can’t We Rely on Federal Agencies and the 
Political Process to Discipline Federal Officers and Compensate 
Their Victims? 
Response: Usually not—and when the political process fails to right 
constitutional wrongs, the courts should remain open for business.  Take 
Hernández, for example.  As mentioned above, in Hernández, a U.S. Border 
Patrol agent shot an unarmed fifteen-year-old Mexican citizen in the back of 
the head as he was fleeing back into Mexican territory.405  This was incredibly 
serious misconduct—so serious that “[t]he shooting quickly became an 
international incident.”406  The U.S. government, however, did nothing to 
remedy this misconduct.  Although the government “express[ed] regret over 
Hernández’s death,” it “concluded that [the agent] had not violated Customs 
and Border Patrol policy or training, and it declined to bring charges or take 
other action against him.”407  The government also denied Mexico’s request 
that the agent stand trial in the Mexican courts.408 
Is this it?  Is this all the process America has to offer?  Place yourself in 
these parents’ shoes:  
We regret that one of our agents shot your son in the back of the head.  
But we looked into it, and we have determined that this agent did not 
violate any of our internal policies.  Therefore, no action will be 
brought against him.  Thank you. 
Sincerely,  
Uncle Sam 
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Hernández dissent, this child’s 
death was “not an isolated incident.”409  Hundreds of formal complaints of 
physical, verbal, and sexual abuse are leveled against the U.S. Border Patrol 
 
 403. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (part of James 
Madison’s statement when he presented the Bill of Rights to Congress).   
 404. Id. 
 405. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740; id. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 406. Id. at 740 (majority opinion).  
 407. Id.  
 408. Id.  
 409. Id. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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each year;410 yet the agency takes formal action in only three percent of 
cases.411 
If our history has taught us anything, it is that the political process, 
without any checks or balances, cannot be trusted to secure actual and 
substantial rights.  Because we are not governed by angels, “auxiliary 
precautions” must always be in place to ensure the government remains 
subservient to the people.412  The most important safeguard in our system of 
government lies with our “independent tribunals of justice,”413 without whom 
“all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
nothing.”414 
But in recent years, the Court’s conservative majority has increasingly 
used the political process to justify closing the courthouse doors on civil rights 
plaintiffs.415  In Alden v. Maine, for example, the Court held that the 
Constitution broadly prohibits the States from being sued without their 
consent.416  Although the U.S. Solicitor General fervently argued that lawsuits 
against the States were necessary to ensure that the States remain in 
compliance with federal law,417 the Alden Court dismissed this worry, arguing 
that the States’ “good faith” should be enough to ensure federal supremacy:  
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity 
. . . does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the 
Constitution or valid federal law. The States and their officers are 
bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal 
statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are unwilling 
to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the 
 
 410. See id. at 760 (showing that at least 800 complaints were made against 
U.S. Border Patrol between 2009 and 2012).   
 411. Id. (citing DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ ET AL., NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF 
CBP ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS OF ABUSE, AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL 1–8 (2014)).  
 412. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 413. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed. 1834) (part of James 
Madison’s statement when he presented the Bill of Rights to Congress).   
 414. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 415. Chemerinsky, supra note 293 at 540–42.  But see Shelby Cty., Ala. v. 
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a key provision of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 without any sort of constitutional basis because the Court believed 
Congress’s data was probably out of date). 
 416. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). The Court conceded that there 
was nothing in the text of the Constitution that compelled this result.  Id. at 741–
43.  Rather, the Court held that the Constitution’s “silence” on this issue was 
evidence that the framers wanted the States to be immune from suit.  Id. at 41.  
Alden is one of the clearest examples that the Court’s conservatives are textualists 
only when it is convenient for them.   
 417. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 11, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 
(No. 98-436). 
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binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus 
provides an important assurance that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land.”418 
If you have never read this portion of Alden before, your jaw should be 
on the floor.419  This is an astounding dereliction of duty.  The Court’s 
argument is roughly this: the States promised us they will not violate the 
Constitution; therefore, the States cannot be sued for allegedly violating the 
Constitution.  This is ludicrous.  
 As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out: “Is it possible to 
imagine that 30 or 40 years ago, at the height of the civil rights movement, the 
Supreme Court would have issued such a statement that state governments 
simply could be trusted to voluntarily comply with federal law?”420  Of course 
not.  The government, from time to time, is going to exceed the Constitution’s 
boundaries; it is the federal courts’ job to see that these boundaries are 
meaningfully enforced and not just suggestions written on parchment.  By 
deferring constitutional issues to the political branches, the Court is shirking 
its most important duty: enforcing the Constitution.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Every Supreme Court nerd, this author included, has their list of least 
favorite cases.  Over the last fifty years or so, Rodriguez,421 Strieff,422 Shelby 
County,423 Sparkman,424 and Lyons425 are among my least favorites.  But the 
Court’s recent decisions in Ziglar v. Abbasi and Hernández v. Mesa belong in 
 
 418. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754–55.   
 419. Hey, that rhymed. 
 420. Chemerinsky, supra note 293, at 541. 
 421. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding 
that education is not a fundamental right, and that the States’ school-funding 
systems may grossly underfund minority-populated school districts). 
 422. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (holding that it was reasonable for 
an officer to stop a pedestrian without suspicion because the officer later 
discovered the pedestrian had unpaid parking tickets).  
 423. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a key 
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 without any sort of constitutional 
basis).   
 424. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding that judges can never 
be sued for their judicial actions, even if the judge knowingly violated the 
Constitution by ordering a girl to be secretly sterilized during her appendectomy).  
 425. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that the victim 
of a police chokehold did not have standing to challenge the police department’s 
“chokehold policy” because he could not show that the police were likely to choke 
him again).   
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their own category of head-spinningly awful decisions.426  These cases touch 
on far more than their narrow, esoteric legal issues; these cases touch on what 
kind of country we want to live in.  Are we going to live in a country where 
the federal government can round-up, jail, and torture religious minorities 
without consequences?  Are we going to live in a country where federal 
officers can shoot children in the back without consequences?  Shockingly, 
the Supreme Court answered both these questions “yes.”427  In ruling on these 
cases—or, more accurately, in refusing to rule on these cases—the Court 
undermined some of our nation’s most cherished values and shirked its 
obligation to enforce the Constitution.   
What’s worse is that these decisions are just two pieces in a much larger 
puzzle.  Over the last several decades, the Court has embarked on a death-by-
a-thousand-cuts-style campaign of closing the courthouse doors to plaintiffs.  
The Court’s justiciability doctrines, governmental immunity requirements, 
and Bivens limitations have shielded government officials from liability and 
have left many devastated plaintiffs without any sort of remedy.   
Long ago, the Court declared:  
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law . . . All 
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are 
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it . . . [And the] Courts of 
justice are established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights 
of the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights in controversy 
between them and the government.428   
The Court’s conservative majority, however, has completely ignored this 
promise and has consistently allowed federal officials to avoid responsibility 
for their blatantly unconstitutional behavior.  The time has come for the Court 
to reverse course, and for scholars to say in a united voice, enough is enough. 
 
 
 426. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 
735 (2020). 
 427. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869; Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750. 
 428. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).  
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